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Introduction
The imminent establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)'
has brought into sharp focus many concerns and myths about the treaty
regime for the ICC and raised questions about what the United States
should do to safeguard its interests and either adjust to the reality of the
Court or seek to oppose its creation or operation. As the chief U.S. negotia-
tor for the ICC treaty regime until January 20, 2001, I, for years, have
observed and responded to a wide variety of views and hyperbole about
* Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., formerly U.S.
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001), and head of the U.S.
delegation to the United Nations talks on the ICC. Ambassador Scheffer is a member of
the New York and District of Columbia Bars. He wishes to thank Andreea Vesa for her
assistance with research for this article. The views expressed in this article are his own.
Ambassador Scheffer dedicates this article to the memory of the late Monroe Leigh,
whose integrity and guidance on this issue served the interests of all Americans.
1. See The CICC International Criminal Court Home Page, at http://www.iccnow.
org (last visited Feb. 5, 2002) (conveying that there are 139 signatories to the ICC Treaty
and that, as of Feb. 5, 2002, fifty-two ratifications have been deposited towards the req-
uisite number of sixty ratifications).
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the ICC. 2 The record needs to be set straight at this critical juncture so
that the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government can
properly examine the ICC treaty regime and reach informed decisions
about how to direct U.S. policy towards the ICC. 3 In this Article, I will
2. See generally U.S. Department of State Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues: International Criminal Court Remarks, at http://www.state.gov/www/
global/swci/pagecourt.html (August 31, 1998) [hereinafter ICC Remarks].
3. The American Servicemembers' Protection Act ("ASPA") (also, at times, known
as the American Armed Forces Protection Act of 2001 ("AAFPA")) has been an attempt
to challenge future U.S. participation in the ICC process. See The American Ser-
vicemembers' Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3338, 107th §§ 9001-9012 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Final ASPA in the Senate]. The initial version of the Act, which was exceptionally
punitive in character, appeared in the summer of 2000, with a substantial number of
sponsors including, in the U.S. Senate, Senator Jesse Helms and in the U.S. House of
Representatives, Representative Tom DeLay. See The American Servicemembers' Protec-
tion Act of 2000, S. 2726, 106th Cong. (2000); see also The American Servicemembers'
Protection Act of 2000, HR. 4654, 106th Cong. (2000); The American Servicemembers'
Protection Act of 2000: Implications for US Cooperation with the ICC, at http://
www.unusa.org/issues/icc/servicefact.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002). In 2001, the Act
(slightly revised) was re-introduced by Representative DeLay in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives on May 8, 2001 and by Senator Helms in the U.S. Senate on May 9, 2001. See
Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court: Helms and DeLay Re-
Introduce ASPA, at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/aspareenter.html (last visited Jan.
21, 2002) [hereinafter Helms and DeLay Re-Introduce ASPA]. The U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives approved the Act on May 10, 2001, by a vote of 282 to 137, but it thereafter
languished in the Senate. See Helms and DeLay Re-Introduce ASPA. ASPA was a piece of
domestic legislation that, among its punitive counterpunches, included measures such
as cutting off military assistance to pro-ICC governments. It also sought to insulate U.S.
military personnel from the Court's reach. See David J. Scheffer, Commentary, Don't
Forfeit the Global Criminal Court, DEFI-NSENEWS.COM, May 29, 2001, available at http://
www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/press200l.html#scheffer [hereinafter DEFENSENEWS OP-ED];
see David J. Scheffer, Statement Before the House International Relations Committee, at
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/2000/000726_scheffer service.html (July
26, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 House International Relations Committee Testimony]; see
also David J. Scheffer, Address at American University; Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward
the International Criminal Court, at http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/2000/
000914_scheffer au.html (Sept. 14, 2000) [hereinafter AU Speech] (last visited Jan. 21,
2002). During the fall of 2001, the Bush Administration negotiated further revisions to
ASPA that strengthened the President's waiver authority and removed the provision that
would have prevented U.S. participation in UN peace operations without a guarantee of
non-exposure to ICC jurisdiction for U.S. service members as well as the provision that
withheld U.S. military assistance to governments that have ratified the Rome Statute.
Compare Helms Revised ASPA Statement, § 1403 (2001), available at http://
www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/revised-aspa.html with Final ASPA in the Senate, supra,
§ 9003; see Helms Revised ASPA Statement, § 1405; see also Helms Revised ASPA State-
ment, § 1407(a). But the provision authorizing the use of "all means necessary and
appropriate to bring about the release" of any U.S. service member or certain other
foreign nationals from ICC custody remained. Compare Helms Revised ASPA Statement,
§§ 1408(a)-1408(b) with Final ASPA in the Senate, supra, §§ 9006(a)-9006(b). Without
any hearings in 2001 by either the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Senator Helms attached this latest version of the revised
ASPA as an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for the Fiscal
Year 2002 ("DOD Appropriations bill") in the final hours of the bill's consideration by
the Senate. The Helms amendment (albeit apparently containing some definitions for
terms that were no longer applicable for the negotiated version being voted on) was
adopted by the Senate on a vote of 78 to 21 on December 7, 2001, following the defeat
(by a vote of 51-48) of a more moderate amendment introduced by Senator Chris Dodd.
Vol. 35
2001-2002 Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court 49
argue for continued American engagement in the negotiations of the Pre-
paratory Commission on the ICC, 4 for U.S. non-opposition to the evolution
and establishment of the ICC, and for U.S. initiatives that would make
cooperation with the ICC desirable, protect U.S. interests, and make U.S.
ratification of the ICC Treaty more plausible in the future.
The terrorist assaults of September 11, 2001 on the United States 5
were crimes against humanity6 that probably would have fallen within the
jurisdiction of the ICC had the Court existed on that date. Nonetheless,
the utility of the ICC for future acts of international terrorism that also
constitute one of the established crimes of the ICC is apparent and should
influence the debate in the United States as to the merits of the Court and
American participation in it. The long war against terrorism will be incom-
patible with any American effort to oppose and dismantle the ICC. If only
in its own self-interest, the United States will want to collaborate with its
See Final ASPA in the Senate, supra, §§ 9001-9012 (2001); see also 147 Cong. Rec.
S 12612-S 12628 (Dec. 7, 2001) (displaying the congressional debate regarding the Helms
and Dodd proposed amendments to the DOD Appropriations bill). In conference com-
mittee, however, the Senate receded to the ICC-related amendment that had been spon-
sored by Representative Henry Hyde in the House version of the DOD Appropriations
bill. The Hyde amendment requires that "jn]one of the funds made available in Division
A of this Act may be used to provide support or other assistance to the International
Criminal Court or to any criminal investigation or other prosecutorial activity of the
International Criminal Court." See 147 Cong. Rec. H8547 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 2001).
The Hyde amendment applies only to Defense Department funding and is limited to
Fiscal Year 2002. The Helms amendment was not so limited in its scope. By receding to
the House, the Senate essentially dropped the Helms amendment and replaced it with
the Hyde amendment. On December 20, 2001, the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives approved the DOD Appropriations bill with the Hyde amendment and without the
Helms amendment. See Bill Summary and Status for the 107th Congress, H.R. 3338,
available at http://@ @L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 21, 2002). President Bush
signed the DOD Appropriations bill into law on January 10, 2002. See Bush Signs
Defense Spending Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/national/AP-Bush-Military.html.
4. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court ("PrepCom"), at http://www.un.org/
law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
5. See Guy Gugliotta, N.Y. Skyscrapers Collapse After Hijacked Planes Hit, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2001 (late ed.), at Al; see also Matea Gold & Maggie Farley, America
Attacked; Strike Against the Nation; Terrorists Attack New York, Pentagon, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2001, at Al.
6. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, would appear to meet the criteria
for crimes against humanity, in that they constituted murder that appears to have been
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian popu-
lation, and presumably with knowledge of the attack by the perpetrators and their pre-
sumed conspirators. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), art. 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/html/icc19990712.html [hereinafter ICC Statute]; see also Fre-
deric L. Kirgis, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, AM. Soc.
INT'L LAW NEWSLETTER (ASIL, Wash., D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 11; Mary Robinson, State-
ment at the International Conference on Human Rights and Democratization, at http://
www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view0l/ (Oct. 8, 2001) ("In the aftermath of the
catastrophe of 11 September the human rights voice must be heard. The thousands of
civilians who died in this atrocity lost the most precious of rights, the right to life.
Those responsible for these cruel deaths must be made individually accountable for the
crimes against humanity they perpetrated.").
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allies and friends around the world and explore the utility of the ICC as a
potent judicial weapon in the war against terrorism.7
The continuing atrocities of our time and the reasonable expectation
that new international crimes of great magnitude will occur led to delibera-
tions throughout most of the 1990's concerning the creation of a perma-
nent International Criminal Court that would be both a readily available
judicial forum for enforcement and a deterrent to the commission of fur-
ther heinous crimes. The idea of a permanent Court was not new, 8 but its
implementation gained unprecedented support during the last decade of
the twentieth century. The establishment and trial work of the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
demonstrated the utility of separate international courts for specific crimes
committed in two different regions of the world. 9 Additional ad hoc courts
were negotiated and are being established either at the international or
national level to adjudicate international crimes committed in Cambodia
during the Pol Pot regime of 1975-79,10 in Sierra Leone from 1996 to the
7. The United States expressed serious reservations about the inclusion of crimes
of international terrorism and drug-trafficking in the ICC Treaty, speculating that a
court of this nature would not be able to investigate complex terrorist cases as precisely
as national governments do and that if such cases are drawn within the ICC's jurisdic-
tion there would be an investigative overload. See Comments of the United States of
America Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Report of the Secretary-General, at 10-13, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add.2 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Report]. During the deliberations
[wle said that while we had an open mind about future consideration of crimes
of terrorism and drug crimes, we did not believe that including them will assist
in the fight against these two evil crimes. To the contrary, conferring jurisdic-
tion on the Court could undermine essential national and transnational efforts,
and actually hamper the effective fight against these crimes. The problem, we
said, was not prosecution, but rather investigation.
Id.; Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Hearing Before the
Subcom. on Int'l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 10,
15 (1998) (statement of David Scheffer, Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues,
U.S. Dept. of State) [hereinafter 1998 Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee]. The U.S. view, however, did not deny the possibility that a crime of terrorism
could also qualify as a crime against humanity, a war crime, or genocide and thus fall
within the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction.
8. See CHERIF BASsIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("Since
the end of World War 1 (1919), the world community has sought to establish a perma-
nent international criminal court.").
9. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 7, 8-9 (2001) (describing the impact that the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have had in post-conflict contexts and how
international criminal justice, embodied in these two institutions, has "preventative
potential"). See generally The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002); The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at http://www.ictr.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
10. See G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/52/644/Add.2
(1997), available at http://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares52/res52135.htm (request-
ing that the UN Secretary-General and the Cambodian government work together in
order to address past serious violations of Cambodian and international law); see also
Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly
Vol. 35
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present,1 1 and in East Timor in 1999.12
The fundamental reason for these courts is the international commu-
nity's resolve and potential to respond to the international crimes of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and ensure that the leading
perpetrators of these crimes are brought to justice. The world has changed
within a relatively short number of years. With the end of the Cold War
and the growing number of democracies and pluralistic societies commit-
ted to the advancement of human rights and the rule of law,1 3 it simply is
no longer tenable either among democratically elected political leaders or
among the publics they serve to tolerate impunity for the commission of
such international crimes, The victims of international crimes voice a
much stronger determination to see that justice is rendered. Civil society
has mobilized to support victims, investigate international crimes, and
pressure governments and international organizations to react effectively.
Where the will exists within the international community, there is enor-
mous pressure to find the means to fulfill that political and societal resolve
in favor of justice.
There are many different mechanisms that the international commu-
nity is exploring and using to respond to genocide, crimes against human-
Resolution 52/135, at 21-32 (1999), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cam-
bodia-1999.html (recommending various means through which members of the Pol Pot
regime could be held criminally responsible: domestic trials, a tribunal under Cambo-
dia law, a United Nations tribunal, and a Cambodian tribunal under United Nations
administration); Cambodian King Approves Khmer Rouge trial law, CNN, Aug. 10, 2001,
at http : //www. cnn. corn / 2001 /WORLD / asiapcf/ southeast/ 08 / 10 / cambodia. king/
index.html (discussing the Cambodian king's ratification of domestic legislation estab-
lishing a UN assisted tribunal for the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders).
11. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000)
(requesting that the UN Secretary General issue a report concerning the establishment
of a special court in order to prosecute perpetrators in Sierra Leone); see also Report of
the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 13, U.N.
Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) (delineating the legal framework and requisite administrative
elements for the establishment of a Sierra Leonean special court); S.C. Res. 1370, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1370 (2001) (encouraging the Secretary-Gen-
eral, the government of Sierra Leone and others involved "to expedite the establishment
of ... the Special Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000").
12. See Reg. 2000/15, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, at 1, U.N.
Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/
untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf (establishing a special panel of judges to address serious crimi-
nal offences committed in East Timor).
13. See Press Release, Freedom House, Democracy's Century; A Survey of Global
Political Change in the 20th Century, at 1, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/
century.html (Dec. 7, 1999) ("The findings herein [this reporti are significant. They
show a dramatic expansion of democratic governance over the course of the century.
... They reinforce the conclusion that humankind, in fits and starts, is rejecting oppres-
sion and opting for greater openness and freedom."); see also Freedom in the World;
Tables and Charts; Tracking Democracy, at 1 (2001), at http://www.freedomhouse.org/
research/freeworld/2001/tracking.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2002) (explaining that
between 1995 and 1996 the total number of democracies was 117 and that between
2000 and 2001 that number grew to 120).
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ity, and war crimes. 14 The mechanisms include international courts,
national courts, truth and reconciliation commissions, historical commis-
sions, and other means of transitional justice. 15 No one mechanism is ade-
quate to the task; all of them will be used in the years ahead depending on
the circumstances surrounding particular atrocity crimes and the desires
of victims and governments about how to address them.
The permanent International Criminal Court is needed at one extreme
of this spectrum of mechanisms: where individuals in leadership positions
need to face criminal accountability for their participation in atrocity
crimes (committed after the establishment of the ICC) and relevant
national courts have not met their responsibility to investigate and prose-
cute such leaders. There can no longer be the gap in the international sys-
tem that has existed in the past; namely, the possibility that an individual
in a leadership position of significant political character or military or
paramilitary or police rank can plan or otherwise participate in the com-
mission of atrocity crimes and yet enjoy virtual impunity. Internationally,
that possibility is no longer tolerable even though it may well exist for some
time to come before the rule of law and its enforcement takes hold through
a combination of international and national efforts. The tide is turning
against unqualified arguments that would have the "act of state doctrine" 16
shielding the commission of atrocities by individual leaders, or the protec-
tions of "head of state immunity"' 7 or "diplomatic immunity"' 8 perma-
nently absolving leaders of criminal responsibility and accountability for
atrocity crimes. 19 The notion that political imperatives immunize any indi-
14. For the purposes of this Article, I will refer to these international crimes as
"atrocity crimes," a term that I more fully define, explain and defend elsewhere in a
forthcoming book.
15. See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAl JUSTICE 6 (2000) (discussing the various roles
that the law assumes during a period of political transition: punishment, historical
inquiry, reparations, purges, and constitution making); see also DOROTHY C. SHEA, THE
SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION: THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION 5 (2000). Shea
describes the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as:
the most ambitious truth commission to date, with a mandate that includes tak-
ing measures to restore dignity to victims and granting amnesty to eligible per-
petrators of gross human rights violations, in addition to establishing as
complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes, and extent of gross human
rights violations that took place inside and outside of South Africa's borders
between 1960 to 1994.
Id. See generally 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FOR-
MER REGIMES xxi-xxvii (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (enumerating the various legal options
that transitional governments are presented with such as criminal sanctions, administra-
tive sanctions, truth commissions, and means of compensation, restitution and rehabili-
tation for affected victims).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 (1986).
17. See id. § 451.
18. See id. § 464.
19. The trend to deprive heads of state of their immunity against criminal prosecu-
tion gained momentum with the decision issued by England's House of Lords against
former Chilean Dictator Augusto Pinochet. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner
of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet, reprinted in 37 1.L.M. 1302
(1998); Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others,
Ex Parte Pinochet, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet
Vol. 35
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vidual from criminal law with respect to the worst possible crimes directed
against humankind is quickly losing credibility, and no democratic govern-
ment - certainly not the United States of America - could champion such
impunity and remain true to the fundamental governing principles of a
modern civilized society.
Some American commentary and Congressional activity derive from
the presumption that somehow the ICC is a threat to national interests,
that the United States can prevent it from being established and, whether
or not it is created, wage a virtual war against the Court and thus deny it
legitimacy and effectiveness. 20  This is a dangerous, futile, and indeed
embarrassing presumption. Some of the criticism overlooks the totality of
the treaty regime, namely the Statute and all of the supplemental docu-
ments being negotiated and finalized in the Preparatory Commission. Nar-
row-minded analyses that only examine the ICC Treaty and ignore the
supplemental documents can be greatly misleading and simply erroneous.
For the United States to position itself as the enemy of the rule of law
Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 312 (2001) (In "[tihe two
House of Lords [Pinochet] decisions.., the court held that there was no former head-of-
state immunity for certain international crimes, including torture."); Reed Brody, The
Prosecution of Hissene Habre - An "African Pinochet", 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321, 333-34
(2001) (analyzing the initiation of proceedings against former Chadian Dictator Hissene
Habre for human rights violations and designating it as the first continuing case to apply
the "Pinochet precedent" on the African continent where a nation has brought charges
against another nation's head of state).
20. Upon U.S. signature of the ICC Treaty, Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared: "This decision will not stand. I will
make reversing this decision, and protecting America's fighting men and women from
the jurisdiction of this international kangaroo court, one of my highest priorities in the
new Congress." Helms Press Release on Clinton Signature, at http://www.wfa.org/
issues/wicc/helmsrel.html (Dec. 31, 2000); see also Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty
for Court On War Crimes; Foes Say Tribunal Could Override Americans' Constitutional
Rights, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 2001, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/arti-
cle.cgi?f=chronicle/archive/2001/01/01/MN133236.DTL. Criticism of the ICC contin-
ued throughout the Congressional debate regarding the proposal of ASPA. See 107
CONG. REC. H2118 (daily ed. May 10, 2001) (statement of Representative DeLay), availa-
ble at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/aspareenter.html. Some commentators and
scholars also joined in the criticisms. See John Bolton, Speech Two: Reject and Oppose the
International Criminal Court, in TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? THREE
OPTIONS PRESENTED AS PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 37-52 (Alton Frye ed., 1999) (attacking the
legitimacy of the ICC and the Prosecutor, stating that the Court's authority is vague and
excessively elastic, criticizing the lack of clarity in defining the crimes included in the
ICC Statute, mentioning that the ICC poses a threat to U.S. military leaders and top
government officials, warning that the Court carries an enormous risk of becoming
politicized, emphasizing that the ICC weakens the UN Security Council's role, and argu-
ing that the notion of complementarity - proposed by ICC supporters to mean that the
international Court will pay deference to national courts - actually stands against the
creation of the ICC); see also Jeremy Rabkin, A Dangerous Court, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
2001, at 14, available at http://delphi-s.dia.smil.mil/admin/EARLYBIRD/010103/
e20010103dangerous.htm (calling the U.S. signature of the ICC Treaty "a betrayal of
American interests"); Stephen D. Krasner, A World Court That Could Backfire, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2001 (late ed.), at A15 ("The fundamental problem with the International Crimi-
nal Court is not that it may lead to the prosecution of American servicemen, although
this could happen, but that courts are the wrong instrument for dealing with large-scale
war, devastation, destruction and crimes against humanity.").
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would be a remarkable reversal of American international law enforcement
policy sustained throughout the 20th century. In fact, the consequences
for U.S. national interests in pursuing a rejectionist strategy of the ICC
would be exceptionally negative and far-ranging. This is particularly so in
the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States
and the creation of an anti-terrorism coalition under U.S. leadership.
2 1
While in government service, I frequently raised concerns about spe-
cific issues relating to the ICC and challenged negotiators to improve the
treaty regime. 2 2 But those statements should not be interpreted as opposi-
tion to the Court itself, particularly by critics of the ICC who now some-
times take them out of context. 23 As I often said on behalf of the Clinton
Administration, the world needs a permanent International Criminal
Court and the United States needs to keep working diligently as a faithful
21. See Larry Sequist, In New War, Innovation is Needed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 9, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1009/pllsl-coop.html
("The United States is leading an international campaign both to root out terrorist net-
works and to cut off their sources of support.").
22. See David J. Scheffer, Address Before the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia, at
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/971113_scheffer-tribunal.html (Nov. 13,
1997) [hereinafter Carter Center Address] (anticipating issues such as defining clear
principles of international criminal law within the ICC Treaty, ensuring that the perma-
nent International Criminal Court does not replace national courts in handling every-
day cases, limiting the independent Prosecutor's power, and confirming an essential role
for the UN Security Council); see also David J. Scheffer, Address Before the Southern
California Working Group on the International Criminal Court, at http://
www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980226 scheffer humlaw.html (Feb. 26,
1998) [hereinafter Address Before the Southern California Working Group on the ICC]
(delineating concerns such as the compatibility of the Security Council with the future
ICC, complementarity between the jurisdiction of the ICC and the jurisdiction of
domestic courts, the role of the ICC Prosecutor, and other administrative elements of the
Court); DavidJ. Scheffer, Address Before the Committee of Conscience, 5-10, at http://
www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/980422 scheffer-genocide.html (Apr. 22,
1998) (discussing the major issues that remained unresolved at the end of the March-
April 1998 ICC Preparatory Commission session: complementarity, notice by public
announcement when a referral to the ICC occurs, the ability of the Security Council to
refer armed conflicts or atrocities to the ICC, the avoidance of politicizing the ICC, and
the protection of members of the U.S. Armed Forces from unjustified exposure to crimi-
nal legal proceedings); David J. Scheffer, Statement on the Status of Negotiations, at
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/980715_scheffericc.html (July 15,
1998); David J. Scheffer, Statement on Creating an International Criminal Court, at
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/980831_scheffericc.html (Aug. 31,
1998) (explaining the remaining flaws in the ICC Treaty at the end of the Rome Confer-
ence); David J. Scheffer, Remarks Before the 6th Committee of the 53rd General Assem-
bly, at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/ 1998/98102 1_scheffericc.html
(Oct. 21, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Speech Before the UNGA 6th Committee] (enumerat-
ing the reasons as to why the United States was not going to sign the ICC Treaty in its
then present form); David J. Scheffer, Twelfth Annual U.S. Pacific Command Interna-
tional Military Operations and Law Conference, 7-11 (Feb. 23, 1999), at http://
www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1999/990223_schefferhawaii.html.
23. See Final ASPA in the Senate, supra note 3, § 9002(4)-(5) (taking portions of
Amb. Scheffer's testimony before Congress on July 23, 1998, delivered prior to further
developments in the negotiations, out of context in order to embellish the anti-ICC
nature of the ASPA bill).
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negotiator to ensure that the best possible court is established. 24 The
United States became a signatory State to achieve that objective. 25
In this Article, I will seek to clarify many of the concerns that the
Clinton Administration raised about the ICC, respond to some of the criti-
cisms and myths that have been advanced about the Court, and propose
steps that the United States could take to protect its interests and
strengthen the universality and effectiveness of the ICC. The Article is
divided into four sections. Section I explains the rationale for President
Bill Clinton's decision on December 31, 2000 to authorize signature of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Section II describes the
evolution of the major U.S. concern over personal jurisdiction prior to and
at the Rome Conference, how that concern and other concerns were
resolved, or otherwise addressed, in the Treaty or its supplemental docu-
ments, and what concerns remained unresolved on December 31, 2000.
Section III summarizes the more prominent safeguards in the ICC Treaty
regime available to U.S. personnel and those additional safeguards that
would be available if the United States were to ratify the Treaty. Section IV
proposes further initiatives that could be undertaken either in the negotia-
tions of the Preparatory Commission of the ICC or unilaterally by the
United States to protect American interests and improve the prospects for
U.S. cooperation with the ICC and ultimate U.S. ratification of the Treaty.
I. Why the United States Signed the Rome Statute
After nearly eight long years of work on proposals for an International
Criminal Court, 26 the Clinton Administration had to decide no later than
December 31, 2000, whether the United States would sign the proposal
24. See Carter Center Address, supra note 22, at 4 ("We are confident that, with an
acceptable outcome to the negotiations and ultimately with the support of the U.S. Sen-
ate, we will see a permanent international criminal court with strong U.S. participation
by the end of this century."); see also Address Before the Southern California Working
Group on the ICC, supra note 22, at 5.
Let me emphasize, too, this Administration's strong support for the creation of a
permanent international criminal court. We want it to be a fair, effective, and
efficient court and a court that we can support - just as we have provided essen-
tial support to the Yugoslav and Rwanda war crimes tribunals both during their
creation and continuing through the present.
Id.; see also David J. Scheffer, Remarks, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria;
The Global Challenge of Establishing Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity 8
(Aug. 22, 2000), at http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/2000/000822shef-
fer.pretoria.html ("[TIhe United States can be a good neighbor to the International
Criminal Court regardless of whether we achieve party status or not in the near
future.").
25. See CICC: Country-by-Country Ratification Status Report, at http://www.icc
now.org/html/country.html#u (last visited Feb. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Country-by-Coun-
try Ratification Status Report].
26. This process began in early 1993 with the International Law Commission's
("ILC") work on a draft statute and continued through the completion of the ILC Draft,
the Ad Hoc Committee of 1995, the Preparatory Committee in 1996-1998, the Rome
Conference, and the Preparatory Commission of 1999-2000. See Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter ILC Report[. See generally Prepara-
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that prevailed, namely, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (the "ICC Treaty"). 2 7 Article 125(1) of the Statute established that
date as the last possible day for signature,2 8 following which a state would
have to accede to the Statute in order to become a party to it.29 In the Fall
of 2000, following the significant adoption by consensus of the Elements of
Crimes 30 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 3 ' at the June session of
the Preparatory Commission, 32 I began to explore the merits of a signature
strategy for the United States. The Elements of Crimes and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence had been pillars of the U.S. negotiating position
prior to and during the Rome Conference. They only exist in the treaty
regime because of U.S. advocacy, which overcame stiff opposition from
other governments. 33 Therefore, their adoption on June 30, 2000, was no
small achievement. It is noteworthy that some critics of the ICC Treaty
tory Commission for the International Criminal Court, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
27. See Clinton Endorses War Crimes Treaty with Reservations, ST. Louis PosT-DIs-
PATCH, Jan. 1, 200 1, available at http://www.postnet.com/postnet/stories.nsf/ByDo.../
4345EC6A31C5FBE0862569C7002ACAB ("Acting at the last moment, President Bill
Clinton on Sunday [Dec. 31, 20001 authorized the United States to sign a treaty estab-
lishing the world's first permanent international war crimes tribunal.").
28. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 125(1).
This Statute shall be open for signature by all States in Rome, at the headquar-
ters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, on 17 July
1998. Thereafter, it shall remain open for signature in Rome at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Italy until 17 October 1998. After that date, the Statute shall
remain open for signature in New York, at the United Nations Headquarters,
until 31 December 2000.
Id.
29. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 125(3) ("This Statute shall be open to acces-
sion by all States. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations.").
30. See generally Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court; Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/
2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000), available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/u.n. html [herein-
after ICC Elements of Crimes]; THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 3-231 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter LEE,
ICC EILEMENTS AND RuLES].
31. See generally Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court; Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1 (2000), available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/
u.n..html [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence]; LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, at 235-702.
32. See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3 (2000), at 3, available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/
u.n..html (describing how the PrepCom adopted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
and the Elements of Crimes for the ICC on June 30, 2000).
33. See William Lietzau, A General Introduction to The General Introduction: Animat-
ing Principles Behind the International Criminal Court's Elements of Crimes (on file with
Cornell International Law Journal).
ITIhe United States was . . . the clear and almost singular proponent of an Ele-
ments of Crimes document for the International Criminal Court Statute. Moreo-
ver, equally relevant, though probably less openly admitted, is the fact that the
United States is the only state to have attended each and every drafting and
negotiating session that formulated the text currently found in the document.
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continue to ignore these documents in their critiques.3 4
I believed there was merit in signature provided we could emerge from
the November/December 2000 Preparatory Commission session with
enough progress to make a credible case for signature. Our March 2000
proposal previously floated with governments was not succeeding. It had
become utterly unrealistic to believe that the United States would obtain
support, much less the necessary consensus, for the silver bullet of guaran-
teed 100 percent protection for U.S. service members (particularly while
the United States remained a non-State Party) that had so long been a pri-
mary objective of the U.S. delegation.
There remained considerable opposition to signature from certain
Members of Congress and from within the Executive Branch. U.S. officials,
including myself, had repeatedly confirmed that the United States would
not sign the "present text" of the ICC Treaty and, as time elapsed after the
Rome Conference, that there was no decision "at this time" to sign the
Treaty. 3 5 No U.S. official publicly stated with any authorization that the
United States would never sign the Rome Statute. Nor, when briefing Con-
gressional staffers, did I ever foreclose the possibility of signature. That is
a Presidential prerogative that must not be denied unless the President
himself has so instructed it, which President Clinton never did. Until the
tide turned in December 2000, I stated that Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright had not reached her own decision on the matter and that, in any
event, I saw little if any support within the Clinton Administration for sig-
nature. When asked by Congressional staffers whether I personally would
recommend signature, I responded that it would depend on the outcome of
the November/December 2000 Preparatory Commission session and that I
would need to consult more thoroughly with Secretary Albright to ascer-
tain her views before reaching my own final judgment. But I noted that
there are advantages to signature and I explained those advantages in my
briefings to Congressional staffers. No Member of Congress requested a
personal briefing from me on the ICC between June 30, 2000, and Decem-
ber 31, 2000, but I testified twice on Capitol Hill during that period about
the ICC and the ASPA of 2000: on July 26, 2000 before the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee 36 and again on September 15, 2000 before the
Id.
34. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition To The 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an
International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National
Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002).
35. See 1998 Speech Before the UNGA 6th Committee, supra note 22, at 3 ("Mr.
Chairman, having considered the matter with great care, the United States will not sign
the Treaty in its present form. Nor is there any prospect of our signing the present treaty
text in the future."); see also 1998 Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
supra note 7, at 12 (explaining the reasons as to why the United States could not accept
the final draft of the ICC Statute that emerged at the end of the Rome Conference on July
17, 1998).
36. See 2000 House International Relations Committee Testimony, supra note 3.
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Congressional Human Rights Caucus.3 7
As December 2000 approached, I became increasingly persuaded that
six major arguments elucidated the merits of a U.S. signature of the ICC
Treaty:
1. U.S. signature would sustain and greatly increase our influence in
on-going negotiations of the Preparatory Commission regarding key sup-
plemental documents for the ICC, including the definition of the crime of
aggression and how it is triggered, the financial regulations, the first-year
budget, the rules of the Assembly of States Parties, the Relationship Agree-
ment between the United Nations and the ICC, the Agreement on Privi-
leges and Immunities, and the Headquarters Agreement. Signature would
give the United States additional leverage to negotiate whatever proposals
the United States develops for the supplemental documents that are specifi-
cally oriented toward protection of U.S. service members. The United
States also would be in a much stronger position to influence the entire
establishment of the ICC and the decision-making within the Assembly of
States Parties, even if the United States is not one of the first sixty govern-
ments to ratify the ICC Treaty. States Parties would be far more receptive
to U.S. views, knowing that U.S. ratification may be on the horizon and
that the pace or prospect of U.S. ratification will depend in part on the
decisions made in the Assembly of States Parties.
2. The attitude of judges, prosecutors, and other staff of the ICC
towards the United States and its official personnel would be more positive
if the United States is a signatory than if the United States is either not a
signatory or opposed to the ICC Treaty. This is a critical factor in protect-
ing U.S. interests and discouraging legal action against U.S. personnel.
The same principle applies to many other governments that would hesitate
to initiate actions against U.S. personnel if the United States is a signatory
moving towards ratification. Any such action against U.S. personnel might
derail U.S. ratification - a consequence that would not be in the interest of
most States Parties. If the United States were to ratify the Rome Statute, the
United States would be obligated to pay its fair share of the ICC budget,
thus diminishing the costs paid (in some cases substantially) by other
States Parties.
3. As a signatory, the United States would have more influence as an
observer to the Assembly of States Parties prior to any possible status as a
ratified State Party.
4. As a signatory, the United States would sustain its leadership on
international justice issues. That leadership is critical in order to continue
to pursue non-ICC criminal justice initiatives in regions around the world.
U.S. advocacy of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, established either
by the United Nations Security Council or through special treaty arrange-
ments, would suffer if the United States opposed the most popular interna-
37. See DavidJ. Scheffer, Statement Before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus
(Sept. 15, 2000), at http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/2000/000915_schef-
ferhrcaucus.html.
Vol. 35
2001-2002 Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court 59
tional tribunal for criminal prosecution, namely the ICC. As a non-
signatory, U.S. credibility to pursue ad hoc initiatives would rapidly
decline.38
5. U.S. signature would greatly facilitate work on ratification of the
Rome Statute at the appropriate time in the future. It also would stimulate
the necessary revision of federal criminal law 39 and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice 40 so as to take full advantage of the principle of
complementarity.
6. U.S. signature should improve prospects for negotiating Article
98(2) bilateral and multilateral agreements with other governments, 4 1 par-
ticularly other signatory States, and possibly with the ICC itself for the
purpose of preventing the surrender of U.S. citizens or service members to
the Court without prior U.S. consent.
Thus U.S. interests would be best protected, and served, by becoming
a signatory of the ICC Treaty rather than remaining a non-signatory and
losing the leverage and influence that signature would afford the United
States. The only reason to have remained a non-signatory and perhaps
even try to undermine the ICC Treaty would have been that we had
opposed the creation of the Court and believed opposition would have
been practical and in the interests of the United States - views never
accepted by the Clinton Administration in the past and increasingly
implausible as expiration of the signature option fast approached.
During the November/December 2000 session of the Preparatory
Commission, there was no closure on the primary U.S. concern regarding
the exposure of non-State Party nationals. But an initiative was launched
that promised considerable further protection for U.S. citizens both while
the United States remained a non-State Party and in the event it were to
ratify the ICC Treaty and become a State Party. Several close allies pro-
posed that the United States would fare better in the negotiations if we
focused on complementarity and worked the margins of that principle to
protect our interests. With no authority to commit the United States to
signature of the Treaty, I could not press hard for concessions from others.
I had nothing to offer in return for a U.S.-friendly proposal. Nonetheless,
after days of consultations and drafting, wording emerged that used the
38. This fact is particularly true now in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States.
39. Certain sections of Title 18 of the United States Code should be revised as soon
as possible as a matter of national interest. See generally Douglass Cassel, Empowering
United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 428-35 (2001).
40. See generally Uniform Code of Military justice, in MANUAL FOR COURT-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES, Appendix 2, at A2-1-A2-35 (2000); Cassel, supra note 39, at 428-35.
41. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(2).
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to sur-
render a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
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complementarity principle in a manner fully consistent with the Treaty
itself.
The U.S. proposal for incorporation in the Relationship Agreement
between the United Nations and the ICC sought to activate an admissibility
review at the critical moment when a suspect is about to be surrendered to
the Court. 42 Article 19(1) of the Statute states: "The Court shall satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may,
on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance
with Article 17." 4 3 If the United States could be assured that there would
be a further determination of admissibility of a case against an American
service member just prior to the planned surrender of that suspect to the
Court, then an additional protection under the principle of complementar-
ity will have been joined with the other protections already present in the
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
The prospects of a sequential collapse of U.S. efforts to maintain con-
trol over a case involving a U.S. citizen would be exceptionally remote to
begin with, but that is precisely what the critics of the Court are most
concerned about in their worst-case scenarios. 44 One would have to imag-
ine the United States not using its authority under Article 18(2) of the Stat-
ute to seize complete control of any investigation of a situation involving
U.S. citizens, 45 or of the United States not using its authority under Article
18(4) to appeal an adverse ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber to the Appeals
Chamber, 46 or of the United States not using its authority under Article
19(2)(b) to challenge the admissibility of the case 4 7 on the grounds of addi-
42. See generally Working Group on a Relationship Agreement Between the United
Nations and the International Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the United States
of America, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. Pro-
posal PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.171.
43. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 19(1).
44. Gurule, supra note 34, at 30-40.
45. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 18(2).
Within one month of receipt of that notification, a State may inform the Court
that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its juris-
diction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes referred to in
Article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the notification to
States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's inves-
tigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of the
Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation.
Id.
46. See id. art. 18(4) ("The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the
Appeals Chamber against a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance to Article 82.
The appeal may be heard on an expedited basis.").
47. See id. art. 19(2)(b).
Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in Article 17
or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by: ...
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is inves-
tigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted ....
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tional significant facts or significant change of circumstances 48 in order to
create the worst case scenario where the judges simply defy all U.S. efforts
to handle any particular case over which the United States has jurisdiction
and suffer the consequences for the Court's future effectiveness and viabil-
ity that such defiance may trigger.
Despite these complementarity protections, the U.S. delegation sought
to add one more protection that would be consistent with the ICC Treaty
and thus mute criticism that the United States was trying to amend the
Statute to protect its soldiers. Several U.S. allies worked with us to shape a
proposal that keyed off of Article 19(1). 4 9 The proposal emerged with the
following language:
In order to encourage contributions by States to promote international peace
and security, and unless there has been a referral to the Court pursuant to
article 13(b) of the Statute, the United Nations and the Court agree that the
Court shall determine on its own motion pursuant to article 19(1) the
admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17 when there is a request
for the surrender of a suspect who is charged in such case with a crime that
occurred outside the territory of the suspect's State of nationality.
50
In presenting this proposal to the Preparatory Commission on Decem-
ber 7, 2000, 1 emphasized the utility of the proposal for states contributing
forces to international military operations where the presumption typically
holds that investigation of alleged crimes of the character found in the Stat-
ute by the soldiers of contributing States should be investigated initially by
the respective contributing State. It is in the interest of each contributing
State to exercise its rights under the complementarity regime, and to be
assured that the Court is satisfied that admissibility requirements have
been strictly met before a soldier is surrendered to the Court. It also is in
the interest of the United Nations and the future of UN peacekeeping and
peace enforcement operations for this kind of assurance to be embedded in
the ICC Statute. That is why the proposal was so germane to the UN-ICC
Relationship Agreement. My statement before the Preparatory Commis-
sion read in part as follows:
There are numerous provisions in the Relationship Agreement that describe
the need for cooperation between the United Nations and the Court. This
proposal joins that list of provisions.
States that are contributing to UN peacekeeping operations or other
necessary international missions outside their own borders will be
encouraged to continue making such contributions if they know that any
case brought against their personnel in the ICC is indeed an admissible case.
Acting strictly in accordance with the provisions of the ICC Statute, the
Court has the authority to ensure that admissibility indeed is examined.
The Statute's preamble emphasizes the importance of complementarity, and
Id.
48. See id. art. 18(7) ("A State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber under this article may challenge the admissibility of a case under Article 19 on the
grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances.").
49. See id. art. 19(1).
50. See U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17, supra note 42, at 1.
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Articles 17, 18, and 19 reinforce that objective. A State's knowledge that
admissibility will be examined in certain cases will encourage that State and
others to properly and faithfully investigate and prosecute genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes in domestic courts as envisaged by the
principle of complementarity.
The proposal focuses the Court's attention on admissibility at a critical
moment, namely when the request for surrender is made. For contributors
to international peace and security to know that the Court is using its
authority at that time to ensure fairness in the process will add greatly to the
confidence of all States in the operation of the Court and it will strengthen
the political will of States to contribute to UN peacekeeping and other inter-
national efforts to maintain or restore peace and security. The decision
remains in the Court's hands, as required by Article 19, and the criteria the
Court would use for determining admissibility are set forth in Article 17.51
This reasonable treaty-friendly proposal, which would only apply to
international conflicts and thus leave the far more common internal atroci-
ties outside its ambit, was formally presented by the Clinton Administra-
tion with the expectation that it would be seriously considered at
subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Commission where the draft Rela-
tionship Agreement would be further negotiated and finalized. However,
that was not to be the case. The Bush Administration squandered its
opportunity to advance this proposal and further protect U.S. interests by
refusing even to engage in Preparatory Commission discussions on the
Relationship Agreement at the two sessions in 2001. A few mid-level
career lawyers were tasked to engage minimally in the discussions on the
crime of aggression and the financial rules and regulations, but concen-
trated on nothing else that was included in the 2001 Preparatory Commis-
sion agenda. 5
2
The Relationship Agreement was finalized, absent the U.S. proposal, at
the September/October 2001 session and adopted by the Preparatory Com-
mission on October 5, 2001. 5 3 Final action on the Relationship Agree-
ment, as with other supplemental documents, will be taken by the
Assembly of States Parties following establishment of the ICC. Several
51. See David J. Scheffer, Statement Before the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court (Dec. 7, 2000) (on file with the Cornell International Law
Journal).
52. See Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its Seventh Session, at 3, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
prepcomm/mar200l/english/1 revle.pdf (mentioning the items on the February 2001
PrepCom agenda in their totality). See generally Preparatory Commission for the Inter-
national Criminal Court; Eighth Session (2001), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
prepcomm/eighth.htm (presenting a brief overview of the September 2001 PrepCom
session) (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
53. See Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/L.1 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/nov2000/english/wgicclle.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2002). "At its 33rd meeting, on 5 October 2001, the Preparatory Commission adopted
its report on its sixth to eighth sessions, containing the draft [text] of the Relationship
Agreement between the Court and the United Nations .. " Proceedings of the Prepara-
tory Commission at its Eighth Session at 3, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.3/Rev.1 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm.
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other proposals introduced by the United States in Preparatory Commis-
sion sessions in 2000 which would have strengthened protection of U.S.
interests also were not pursued by the U.S. delegation to the Preparatory
Commission sessions in 200 1. 4 The Bush Administration's short-sighted
and anemic approach to the Preparatory Commission had the result of
forfeiting opportunities, well established by our negotiating initiatives in
2000, to strengthen protection of U.S. interests. Nonetheless, in December
2000, the Article 19(1) proposal and the other proposals we had intro-
duced in the Preparatory Commission sessions and which were scheduled
for further discussion in 2001, enabled Clinton Administration officials to
review the state of play in the negotiations and the value of U.S. signature
of the Treaty.
We had not achieved the silver bullet of guaranteed protection that
many officials within the Clinton Administration had sought for so many
years. But I argued that we had achieved the most that pragmatically could
be achieved in light of all that we confronted, both internally and exter-
nally: a sophisticated matrix of safeguards that provided a high degree of
protection for U.S. interests and, with the added leverage of signature and
strong efforts in subsequent Preparatory Commission sessions, additional
safeguards that would achieve the best possible relationship for the United
States with the ICC.
The final deliberative process about signature of the Treaty occurred
during the last three weeks of 2000. Agency views were comprehensively
communicated to the National Security Council and President Clinton,
who was thoroughly briefed about the relevant issues and the pro's and
con's of signature.
President Clinton arrived at his decision to sign the Treaty while at
Camp David on December 30-31, 2000.55 His statement, which was
released on December 31st, is a precisely worded articulation of why the
United States would sign the Treaty and what remained to be done in order
to advance the prospect of serious consideration of ratification of the
Treaty in the future. 56 There were three main points in the statement.
First, President Clinton reaffirmed "our strong support for international
accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. '5 7 Signing the Treaty would sustain
the "tradition of moral leadership" of the United States in advancing the
principle of accountability from Nuremberg through to the establishment
54. See discussion infra Part lID.
55. See Text of President Clinton's Remarks on ICC Treaty, at http://www.wfa.org/
issues/wicc/prestext.html (Dec. 31, 2000) [hereinafter President Clinton Statement].
During the final weeks of December 2000, I was instructed by the National Security
Council not to brief Congressional staffers or the incoming Bush administration transi-
tion team about internal Executive Branch deliberations on the ICC. I was told that
National Security Council staff would contact relevant members of Congress and their
staff, and the transition team when appropriate, and that if I did receive any inquiry, I
should refer the individual to the National Security Council.
56. See President Clinton Statement, supra note 55.
57. Id.
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of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. 58
Second, President Clinton emphasized the importance of the comple-
mentarity principle in the Treaty and that the U.S. delegation had worked
hard to achieve the limitations on the ICC Prosecutor that are part of the
complementarity regime, which the United States believes "are essential to
the international credibility and success of the ICC. '
'59
Third, President Clinton stated that:
[wie are not abandoning our concerns about significant flaws in the Treaty.
In particular, we are concerned that when the Court comes into existence, it
will not only exercise authority over personnel of states that have ratified the
Treaty, but also claim jurisdiction over personnel of States that have not.
With signature, however, we will be in a position to influence the evolution
of the Court. Without signature, we will not.60
The use of the term "significant flaws" was not easily arrived at during
the final hours of the decision-making process. I believed there were flaws
in the Treaty, but I did not believe that a description of them as "signifi-
cant" either was accurate or would improve our leverage as a signatory.
Allied governments do not view as "significant" the flaws we had long iden-
tified. Further, the term would only provide ammunition to the opponents
of the ICC on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to recklessly bash the Treaty,
using our own words to do so. Our work in building safeguards into the
Treaty regime had greatly diminished the significance of the flaws that I
had identified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 28,
1998, shortly after the conclusion of the Rome Conference. 6' President
Clinton's statement goes on to recognize achievements in the post-Rome
negotiations. 6 2 But "significant" was the word that would accommodate
the skeptics in the Administration, so it remained.
The presidential statement on December 31, 2000, concluded with a
two-pronged message. President Clinton recommended that his successor,
who would be President George W. Bush, not "submit the Treaty to the
Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satis-
fied."6 3 This was consistent with the Clinton Administration's long-stand-
ing position on ratification. The most fundamental concern was that,
"Court jurisdictions [sic] over U.S. personnel should come only with U.S.
ratification of the Treaty."6 4 This was consistent with the rather complex
and paradoxical point we had been making for years about the jurisdiction
of the Treaty. 65 The central U.S. concern has been exposure of U.S. per-
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See 1998 Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 7, at
12-15.
62. See President Clinton Statement, supra note 55.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See ICC Remarks, supra note 2.
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sonnel while the United States remains a non-Party to the Treaty. Many of
us in the Clinton Administration had hoped that such a limited problem
could be addressed pragmatically by the Preparatory Commission, which
would only occur with a strong U.S. presence and role in the on-going
negotiations. We long supported non-State Party nationals being subject to
the jurisdiction of the ICC as a result of a Security Council referral pursu-
ant to Article 13(b) of the Treaty.6 6 We also discussed numerous ways to
subject non-State Party nationals of so-called rogue or aggressor states to
the ICC's jurisdiction under certain circumstances even in the absence of a
Security Council referral. We sought some way to enable the ICC to act in
obvious cases. We were prepared to subjugate our legal position to a prag-
matic solution that would address the concern about exposure of U.S. per-
sonnel while the United States is a non-State Party.
6 7
The U.S. legal position was that customary international law does not
yet entitle a state, whether as a Party or as a non-Party to the ICC Treaty, to
delegate to a treaty-based International Criminal Court its own domestic
authority to bring to justice individuals who commit crimes on its sover-
eign territory or otherwise under the principle of universal jurisdiction,
without first obtaining the consent of that individual's state of nationality
either through ratification of the Rome Treaty or by special consent, or
without a referral of the situation by the Security Council. 68 But we made
66. This U.S. position long preceded the Rome Conference. See David J. Scheffer,
Address at the Peace Palace, The Hague, Netherlands 4 (Sept. 19, 1997) [hereinafter
1997 Hague Speech] ("We believe that the Security Council... should be empowered to
refer overall situations to the Prosecutor where there has been apparent commission of
one or more of the core crimes in the Court's jurisdiction."); see also Carter Center
Address, supra note 22, at 3.
67. See AU Speech, supra note 3, at 3 (describing the U.S. proposal concerning the
status of non-state parties in connection with ICC jurisdiction and the fact that the
United States was "prepared to adjust that proposal to 1) eliminate its reference to the
Security Council, and 2) revise its wording so that only non-Party states acting respon-
sibly in the international community and honoring the principle of complementarity
can invoke a privilege of non-surrender of its nationals to the Court.").
68. See AU Speech, supra note 3, at 3; see also David J. Scheffer, The International
Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAl
LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9 3 D ANNUAL MEETING 68-72, 71 (2000); Madeline H. Morris,
High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 29 (2001).
Customary international law evolves as a reflection of the consent or acquies-
cence of states over time. Because consent to universal jurisdiction exercised by
states is not equivalent to consent to delegated universal jurisdiction exercised
by an international court, the customary law affirming the universal jurisdiction
of states cannot be considered equivalent to customary law affirming the dele-
gability of that jurisdiction to an international court.
There are sound reasons for which a state, even while accepting universal
jurisdiction, might wish to reject the delegation of such jurisdiction for exercise
by an international court. A state might reject compulsory third-party adjudica-
tion before the ICC in order to retain the discretion to address interstate-dispute
type cases through bilateral relations, even while recognizing the possibility that
those bilateral relations might in some cases entail the prosecution of that
state's national in another state's courts under universal jurisdiction. The rea-
sons for which states might prefer bilateral relations to third-party adjudication
in interstate disputes involving international criminal law are essentially the
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it clear in the negotiations, and I would hope continue to make it clear, that
as a practical matter the United States is prepared to examine circum-
stances where individuals from non-State Parties can be prosecuted before
the ICC without such requirements - ratification or special consent by the
State of nationality or Security Council referral - having been first
obtained, and to negotiate such latitude for prosecution into a supplemen-
tal document to the Treaty. 69
In addition to the quest to avoid U.S. exposure prior to ratification of
the Treaty, the Clinton Administration sought a matrix of safeguards,
including those we could obtain during the Preparatory Commission nego-
tiations, that would ensure there would be no unwarranted or unfounded
investigation and prosecution of American service members by the ICC
after the United States became a party to the Treaty. That was not intended
to constitute a blanket immunity from investigation and prosecution by the
ICC. Rather, it conceded the possibility of exposure for American service
members to ICC jurisdiction following U.S. ratification, but it would be
exposure of such a remote character as to be exceptionally unlikely and, if
it were to occur, manageable. We were determined to find some pragmatic
formula that would de facto insulate U.S. personnel from ICC jurisdiction
same as the reasons, discussed earlier, for which states are generally reluctant to
submit their interstate disputes to third-party adjudication.
Id.; see also David J. Scheffer, Letter to the Editor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 624 (discussing U.S.
legal position); David J. Scheffer, Letter to the Editor, 80 FOREIGN AI'E. 201 (2001). Con-
trary to some criticism, I pointed to authority on the U.S. position to the evolving schol-
arship of Professor Morris, see Morris, supra. My public statements on this issue were
cleared within the federal bureaucracy. President Clinton confirmed our long-stated
position in his December 31, 2000 statement. See 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 4 (Jan.
9, 2001). It would have been unusual, and beaucratically implausible, for either the
State Department's legal adviser or the attorney general to issue a formal legal opinion
on such a theoretical, albeit important, issue. Despite mighty efforts by scholars to dis-
cern contradictions in the U.S. position, at no time did the precise American position on
the International Criminal Court contradict its support for terrorism treaties or U.S.
invocation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in federal courts for certain crimes. Signifi-
cantly, critics of the U.S. position on jurisdiction fail to point to authorities directly on
point to support their arguments because the issue is so novel. See Monroe Leigh, The
United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 124-31 (2001); see also
Michael Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 213-36 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000); Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 32 CORNELI INT'L LJ. 489, 491 (1999) (taking issue with the U.S.
position regarding non-State Parties and stating that "[ilt is simply incorrect, however, to
suggest that the Rome Statute violates international treaty law by exposing nationals of
non-adhering States to potential prosecution without the consent of their govern-
ments."); Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2000).
69. See AU Speech, supra note 3, at 3. Professor Morris' criticism of our willingness
to compromise on our own legal position is understandable from a strictly purist per-
spective, but the International Criminal Court represents a significant melding of both
political and legal objectives in the international system. Unless governments recognize
that practical solutions must be found for some of the most difficult problems besetting
the ICC, the Court's universality and effectiveness will suffer. See Madeline H. Morris,
Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337,
350 (2001).
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prior to U.S. ratification of the Treaty. That is what led to the diplomatic
proposal of March 2000, which only concerned the exposure of a non-State
Party and its nationals under circumstances for which we knew the United
States could qualify for.70 We admittedly faced an awkward dilemma. We
had to argue for protection as a non-State Party in order to build domestic
support for ultimately signing the ICC Treaty and joining it as a State
Party. Other governments were confused and annoyed with the U.S. strat-
egy. Why, I would often hear them say, should they, signatories and
ratifiers of the ICC Treaty, accord so much special attention to one State's
insistence that it be protected as a non-Party to the Treaty, particularly one
such as the United States where certain Members of Congress were deter-
mined to prevent the Court from ever being established or, if established,
ever to function? They also found it difficult to square the U.S. position on
non-Party protection with how that same privilege would be used by civil-
ian and military leaders of other non-States Parties and rogue elements
therein to shield themselves from the Court's jurisdiction and perpetrate
atrocities at will.
The second prong of President Clinton's conclusion in his statement
of December 31, 2000, was that "signature is the right action to take at this
point."'7 1 He continued, "I believe that a properly constituted and struc-
tured International Criminal Court would make a profound contribution
in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide, and that signature
increases the chances for productive discussions with other governments to
advance these goals in the months and years ahead."72 Signature was the
right action to take on December 31, 2000, because it would keep the
United States "in the game" to finish the work that had to be done to ensure
favorable consideration of the Treaty in the United States Senate some day.
For the United States to have entered 2001 as a non-signatory of the ICC
Treaty would have aligned us, whether fairly or not, with such non-signa-
tory states as the People's Republic' of China, Pakistan, North Korea, Libya,
Cuba, Vietnam, and Iraq as seeming rejectionists of international justice. 7 3
President Clinton responsibly waited as long as he could before decid-
ing to authorize signature of the Treaty on the last possible day under the
terms of the Treaty. He needed to review the results of every Preparatory
Commission session, including the session that concluded on December 8,
2001, before arriving at a judgment as to what had been accomplished to
justify a U.S. signature. He could not have made that decision earlier in the
year 2000 without risking a setback in the Preparatory Commission that
might have pointed towards a decision never to sign the Treaty. The fact
that what was accomplished in the Preparatory Commission by December
70. See U.S. Proposal to the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court; Proposed Text to Supplemental Document to the Rome
Treaty (2000), available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/us2000.html [hereinafter U.S.
Proposed Text for ICC Supplemental Document]; see also discussion infra Part II.C.I.
71. President Clinton Statement, supra note 55.
72. Id.
73. See CICC: Country-by-Country Ratification Status Report, supra note 25 (show-
ing that these states are not on the list as signatories of the Treaty).
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8th fell short of the desired mark of full protection for U.S. service mem-
bers while a non-State Party did not automatically freeze out the option of
signature. The President weighed the considerable progress that had been
made and what further progress was likely if we used our leverage as a
signatory to achieve it. That weighing exercise pointed toward the value of
signature. The President's decision represented work on the ICC through-
out his Administration, and thus was anything but a rushed decision at the
end of December 2000. Regrettably, within weeks of taking office, the Bush
Administration began to close the doors that had been opened to it with
the U.S. signature.
II. Addressing the U.S. Concerns in the ICC Treaty Regime
Negotiations
It would be clearly erroneous to assume that during the Clinton Adminis-
tration the United States stood in opposition to the creation of a permanent
International Criminal Court. Overall, there appears to be a common per-
ception that during the Clinton Administration the United States always
stood in opposition to the creation of a permanent International Criminal
Court.74 The Clinton Administration engaged intensively in the negotia-
tions for the ICC, talks which formally began in 1995. 7 5 We engaged with
the purpose of constructing a detailed and comprehensive framework that
could lead to the establishment of an ICC. 7 6 We demonstrated that sup-
port by exercising leadership in the negotiations and by producing a large
number of papers commenting on and proposing text for the emerging
draft treaty. President Clinton on six occasions publicly expressed his sup-
port for the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court.77
74. See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Specifies Terms for War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 1998, at A7 ("Today's statement underscored how strongly the United States
opposes the kind of court sought by human rights groups and many democratic allies
.... "); see also Charles Trueheart, U.S. Cool to War Crimes Panel; Washington May Not
Back Proposal for Permanent Tribunal, WASH. POST, July, 10, 1998, at A32.; Thomas Lipp-
man, Worldwide War Crimes Court Is Approved, WASH. POST, July 18, 1998, at Al ("The
outcome [of the 1998 Rome Conference] marks a second time in two years that the
United States has rejected a major international humanitarian agreement.").
75. The U.S. fielded a full inter-agency delegation of experts beginning with the first
meeting in February, 1995. See David J. Scheffer, Address Before the Commonwealth
Club, San Francisco, California, 5 (May 13, 1998). See generally ICC Statute, supra note
6.
76. See 1997 Hague Speech, supra note 66, at 3.
President Clinton and Secretary Albright have long supported the establishment
of a fair and effective international criminal court. As President Clinton has
stated, 'Nations all around the world who value freedom and tolerance [should]
establish a permanent international court to prosecute, with the support of the
United Nations Security Council, serious violations of humanitarian law. I']
Id.
77. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at the Opening of the Com-
memoration of "50 Years After Nuremberg: Human Rights and the Rule of Law," Univer-
sity of Connecticut, 1995 PUB. PAPERS 1597, 1598; see also Statements of President
William Jefferson Clinton, at the Army Conference Room in the Pentagon, 33 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 119 (Jan. 29, 1997); President William Jefferson Clinton, Statement
Before the 52d Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
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From the start, however, we never intended that the Treaty's personal juris-
diction would extend as far as the Rome Treaty finally established under
Article 12. To argue that our position on personal jurisdiction reflected an
underlying opposition to the whole concept of a permanent International
Criminal Court or to the Rome Treaty itself is a deeply flawed argument.
We remained on the front line every day since the first UN session in early
1995 negotiating to support the establishment of a permanent Court that
the United States could participate in with confidence and in a manner
that would be compatible with our national and international security
responsibilities. I believe the American people expected that of the U.S.
negotiating team, and we remained faithful to their interests.
A. Prior to July 17, 1998
For years, and until the third week of the Rome Conference in July 1998,
the U.S. position on how the ICC's jurisdiction would be triggered
remained consistent. We accepted very early in the UN talks, held prior to
the Rome Conference, the proposition that a State Party could initiate an
ICC investigation of a situation falling within the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the Statute of the Court. 78 We also agreed with others that the
Security Council could initiate ICC investigations by referring a situation
pursuant to a resolution. 79 We argued for a long time that such a Security
Council referral did not have to be authorized under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. 80 We argued strongly, however, that if Chapter
VII authority were invoked by the Security Council, then the ICC's powers
could be greatly strengthened by that Chapter VII mandate. 8 1 It became
clear prior to Rome that governments were determined to require a Chapter
VII basis for Security Council referrals, and we ultimately conceded that
point. However, our original position would have made it much easier for
the Security Council to use the ICC for investigations because the Council
Doc. 1389 (Sept. 22, 1997); President William Jefferson Clinton, Statement in Honor of
Human Rights Day, the Museum of Jewish Heritage, New York, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 2003 (Dec. 9, 1997); President William Jefferson Clinton, Statement at a White
House Press Briefing on Bosnia, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2074 (Dec. 18, 1997);
President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Work-
ers, and U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials, Kigali Airport, Kigali, Rwanda, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. at 497 (Mar. 25, 1998).
78. See 1997 Hague Speech, supra note 66, at 4 ("We believe that... State Parties to
the statute of the ICC should be empowered to refer overall situations to the Prosecutor
where there has been apparent commission of one or more of the core crimes in the
Court's jurisdiction.").
79. See id. ("We believe that the Security Council ... should be empowered to refer
overall situations to the Prosecutor where there has been apparent commission of one or
more of the core crimes in the Court's jurisdiction.").
80. See AU Speech, supra note 3, at 1; see also 1997 Hague Speech, supra note 66, at
4; David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 12, 13 (1999) [hereinafter Scheffer, AJIL Article] ("We determined that the criti-
cal role of the Security Council as a preliminary review must be sustained when cases
pertaining to the work of the Council (whether or not under Chapter VII authority) were
at issue.").
81. AU Speech, supra note 3, at 1.
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would not have necessarily had to engage in the very difficult negotiations
that are always required for Chapter VII actions and which sometimes
result in the veto power blocking effective action by the Council. If, in
future years, the Council does not refer a particular situation to the ICC,
this may well be the reason.
Our position on initiating ICC investigations required that "if a State
Party referred a situation to the Court and that situation already was the
object of Security Council deliberations, then the Security Council's
approval would be required before the matter could be taken up by the
ICC."'82 This was an important and entirely logical position to take in light
of the Security Council's responsibilities for international peace and secur-
ity and America's own extensive commitments globally to international
peace and security.8 3 That position proved unsustainable as the Rome
Conference progressed in the summer of 1998. The alternative formula-
tion that emerged was the "Singapore compromise," now reflected in Arti-
cle 16 of the Rome Treaty.84 The United States supported that compromise
as the best we could obtain under the circumstances.
During the final two weeks of the Rome Conference, we sought three
different paths in order to achieve U.S. support for the text of the ICC
Treaty and thus join consensus on July 17, 1998.85 Though some may
fault the U.S. delegation for not having initiated these efforts earlier in the
negotiations, they fail to appreciate the complex and multifaceted national
security interests that needed to be balanced as we confronted these issues.
The United States shoulders responsibilities worldwide that no other
nation comes even close to undertaking. The post-September 11, 2001,
campaign against terrorism demonstrates that reality in stark terms. Even
those close allies of ours that are deeply engaged in support of UN
peacekeeping operations are not assuming the vast international security
responsibilities that the United States Armed Forces have worldwide.
Nonetheless, I was deeply disappointed as a negotiator in the failure of the
highest policy-makers in Washington to arrive at decisions about our nego-
tiating positions sooner, particularly their failure to meet and approve more
forward-leaning instructions just prior to the U.S. delegation's departure
for the Rome Conference.
82. Id. at 2.
83. See ILC Report, supra note 26, at 85 (presenting a proposed version of Article
23(3) that was to be introduced in the ICC Treaty: "No prosecution may be commenced
under this Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by the Security
Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of
the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides.").
84. See THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 149-
52 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); see also ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 16.
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.
id.
85. See Scheffer, AJIL Article, supra note 80, at 14.
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Our first effort mid-way through the Rome Conference was to support
a procedure that would permit a State Party to "opt out" of crimes against
humanity and/or war crimes, but not genocide. Indeed, we offered to
empower the Court with universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.
This had originally been proposed by the International Law Commission
in 1994.86 We proposed that any such State Party would forfeit its right to
refer matters to the Court, however, if it chose to opt out of either of these
categories of subject matter jurisdiction. The Security Council could over-
ride the "opt out" with a Chapter VII referral. Although 22 governments,
including France and Russia, openly supported that proposal, it failed to
attract enough support to be sustainable. 8 7
Our second effort, in the final week of the Rome Conference, was a
package deal developed with the other permanent members of the Security
Council that would permit a ten-year transitional period during which a
State Party could opt out of crimes against humanity and/or war crimes.8 8
That privilege would expire at the end of the ten-year period but could be
extended through certain arrangements if there was general agreement
among the States Parties.8 9 If that agreement could not be obtained and
the State Party still required the privilege, then it would have the option of
withdrawing from the Treaty. 90 However, the P-5 proposal failed to attract
sufficient support quickly enough to be sustainable. The modified version
of it, which is now reflected in Article 124 of the Treaty, 9' was never
presented to us until it appeared on the final day of the conference
(although there was a speculative hint about it made to me by another dele-
gate on the penultimate day of the conference). The provision did not meet
86. See ILC Report, supra note 26, at 83.
87. The United States advocated this procedure in an oral statement before the Rome
Conference on July 9, 1998. In response to, the U.S. statement 22 governments
expressed their support for the U.S. proposal. The proposal, in fact, was based on one of
the options for acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court that had emerged from the
final session of the Preparatory Commission on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court in April, 1998. See Report of the Preparatory Commission on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court at 32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1
(1998); see also David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 19 (1999); Stanley, supra note 74; Trueheart, supra note 74; Ales-
sandra Stanley, U.S. Presses Allies to Rein in Proposed War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1998 (late ed.), at A8.
88. See Proposal Submitted by the United States of America; Article 7 ter, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90 (1998) [hereinafter Proposal; Article 7 ter]; see also 1998 Testi-
mony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 7, at 13-14.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 124.
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to
this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into
force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a
crime is alleged to have committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declara-
tion under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this
article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with
article 123, paragraph 1.
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the hard-fought requirements that the United States needed for this partic-
ular approach to subject matter jurisdiction. Of course, we will never know
what might have transpired if the conference had afforded us more time, as
we requested, to consider the provision and discuss it both within the U.S.
government and with other governments.
Our third effort was to propose that Article 12 be drafted either 1) to
require the express approval of both the territorial State of the alleged
crime and the State of nationality of the alleged perpetrator in the event
either was not a Party to the Treaty, 9 2 or 2) to exempt from the Court's
jurisdiction conduct that arises from the official actions of a non-State
Party acknowledged as such by the non-Party. 93 The former proposal rec-
ognized the large degree of support at the conference for the consent of the
territorial state, but also remedied the dangerous drift of Article 12 toward
universal jurisdiction over non-State Parties. 94 The latter proposal
required a non-State Party to acknowledge responsibility for its actions in
order to be exempted, an unlikely occurrence for those who have commit-
ted genocide or other heinous crimes. 95 In contrast, the United States as a
likely non-State Party for at least some period of time would never hesitate
to acknowledge that, for example, humanitarian interventions, peacekeep-
ing actions, or defensive actions to eliminate weapons of mass destruction
or confront international terrorism are official state actions. But the U.S.
proposals failed to attract sufficient support in the short period of time left
for the Rome Conference.
Washington had hoped that the Rome Conference could be extended
to iron out these fundamental problems and arrive at a formula that the
United States and, frankly, some other major states could support. I
worked very hard in the final days to achieve an extension, including a
direct appeal to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan through his representa-
tive at the conference. President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright and other senior U.S. officials sought more flexibility from their
foreign counterparts in the final days. I still believe a fatal flaw in the pro-
cess was the decision not to extend the conference, as is so often done with
other treaty negotiations in order to achieve broader consensus. So while
there are critics who argue the United States did not seize opportunities
early enough to push alternative strategies, it must also be recognized that
the Rome Conference did not seize the opportunity to allow more time to
address a fundamental problem with the ICC Treaty. It probably would
have made an enormous difference to U.S. support for the Treaty if we
could have labored over it for an additional, albeit brief, period of time.
92. See Proposal Submitted by the United States of America; Article 7, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/C.1/L.70 (1998) [hereinafter Proposal; Article 7].
93. See Proposal; Article 7 ter, supra note 88; see also AU Speech, supra note 3, at 2.
94. Proposal; Article 7, supra note 92.
95. Proposal; Article 7 ter, supra note 88.
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B. Major U.S. Objectives Achieved in the ICC Treaty
Despite the unacceptable outcome of the Rome Conference, which com-
pelled the United States to request votes that would enable governments to
register their approval or disapproval of final provisions which the U.S. del-
egation believed needed further negotiation, the United States achieved
many of its negotiating objectives at the Rome Conference.9 6 The major
objectives (in addition to scores of other U.S. objectives that were achieved
in the daily drafting of the Statute) entailed long and difficult negotiating
sessions both before and during the Rome Conference. They included the
following:
1. A strong regime of complementarity, or deferral to national juris-
diction, that provides significant protection. 9 7
2. A role preserved for the UN Security Council, including the affir-
mation of the Security Council's power to intervene to halt the ICC's
work.9 8
3. Sovereign protection of national security information that might be
sought by the ICC. 99
4. Broad recognition of national judicial procedures as a predicate for
cooperation with the ICC.' 0 0
5. Coverage of internal conflicts and atrocities, which comprise the
vast majority of situations likely to confront the ICC. 10 '
6. Important due process protections, including the incorporation in
the treaty regime of detailed rules of procedure and evidence. 10 2
7. Viable definitions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, including high thresholds for any investigation and prosecution
and the incorporation in the treaty regime of elements of crimes. 10 3
8. Recognition of gender issues. 104
9. Acceptable provisions regarding command responsibility and supe-
rior orders. 105
10. Rigorous qualifications for judges. 10 6
11. Acceptance of the basic principle of State Party funding, possible
United Nations funding in relation to expenses incurred due to referrals by
the Security Council, and voluntary contributions. 10 7
96. See Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL IN'L LJ. 443, 458-60 (1999).
97. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, arts. 17-19.
98. See id.; see also id. art. 16.
99. See id. art. 72; see also id. art. 73.
100. See id. art. 93; see also id. arts. 96, 99.
101. See id. art. 6; see also id. arts. 7, 8(2)(c)-(e).
102. See id. art. 19; see also id. arts. 51, 55, 63, 66-69.
103. See id. art. 6; see also id. arts. 7-9.
104. See, e.g., id. art. 7(1)(g)-(h); see also id. arts. 7(2)(c), 7(2)(), 7(3), 8(2)(b)(xxii),
8(2)(e)(vi), 68, 69.
105. See id. art. 28; see also id. art. 33.
106. See id. art. 36.
107. See id. art. 115; see also id. art. 116.
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12. An Assembly of States Parties to oversee the management of the
ICC and the Prosecutor's work.108
13. Reasonable amendment procedures.' 0 9
14. A sufficiently high number of ratifying states before the Treaty
can enter into force; namely, sixty governments have to ratify the Treaty. "10
15. Explicit right to negotiate international agreements (bilateral or
multilateral) to protect any U.S. citizen from surrender to the ICC and, for
example, to honor the provisions of U.S. Status of Forces Agreements."'
16. Diplomatic immunity from surrender to the ICC pursuant to
international law.112
17. Defeat of proposals to include crimes of international terrorism
and international drug trafficking in the ICC's jurisdiction." 13
C. How Flaws in the ICC Treaty Were Addressed Following the Rome
Conference
After the Rome Conference of June/July 1998 the United States remained
deeply engaged in the subsequent Preparatory Commission sessions,
which began in February 1999. We led the negotiations on the Elements of
Crimes 1 4 and provided the working draft for those negotiations. We also
remained deeply engaged with the negotiations on the Rules of Evidence
and Procedure, 115 and were satisfied with the leadership of Australia,
Canada, France and the chairmanship of the Argentine delegate in those
talks. On June 30, 2000, the United States joined consensus in support of
both of those work-engine documents of the Court. 16 Those were not the
actions of a government retreating from the Treaty or waging an opposition
campaign against it. We were determined to remain engaged every step of
the way to represent important U.S. interests in the process and to advance
the cause of international justice.
Specific U.S. objectives that were achieved after the Rome Conference
and during the Preparatory Commission sessions through December 8,
2000, included the following:
1. Adoption by consensus in the Preparatory Commission of the Ele-
ments of Crimes on June 30, 2000, following introduction of the U.S. draft
108. See id. art. 112.
109. See id. art. 121; see also id. art. 122.
110. See id. art. 126.
111. See id. art. 98(2).
112. See id. art. 98(1).
113. But see BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 104-05 (reproducing
Resolution E to the ICC Treaty regarding international terrorism and drug-trafficking).
114. See generally ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30; LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, at 3-231.
115. See generally ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31; LEE, ICC ELE-
MENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 235-702.
116. See generally Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Fifth Session, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prejun.htm (June 12-30, 2000).
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and U.S. lead in the post-Rome negotiations.' 17
2. The General Introduction of the Elements of Crimes 1 8 and the
Introductions to Genocide, 1 19 Crimes Against Humanity 120 and War
Crimes 12 1 in the Elements of Crimes reflect key U.S. requirements.
3. Footnote 44 of the Elements of Crimes which clarifies the scope of
the war crime covering the transfer of population into occupied territory
(as defined by Article 8(2)(b)(viii)) to the satisfaction of the Israeli and U.S.
Governments.1 2 2
4. Adoption by consensus in the Preparatory Commission of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence on June 30, 2000, with hundreds of
detailed provisions pertaining to court procedure, due process rights, and
the collection and use of evidence, many of which were actively sought by
the U.S. delegation. 123
5. Rules 51,124 52(2),125 54(2),126 and 59127 in the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence which strengthen application of the complementarity
principle.
117. See generally ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30; LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, 3-231.
118. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 5; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, at 23-40.
119. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 6; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, at 44-49.
120. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 9; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, at 61-80.
121. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 18; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 30, at 114-16.
122. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 28 ("The term 'transfer' needs to be
interpreted in accordance with the relevant provisions of international humanitarian
law."); see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 158-62.
123. See generally ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31; LEE, ICC ELE-
MENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, 235-702.
124. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 31.
In considering the matters referred to in article 17, paragraph 2, and in the
context of the circumstances of the case, the Court may consider, inter alia,
information that the State referred to in article 17, paragraph 1, may choose to
bring to the attention of the Court showing that its courts meet internationally
recognized norms and standards for the independent and impartial prosecution
of similar conduct, or that the State has confirmed in writing to the Prosecutor
that the case is being investigated or prosecuted.
Id.; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, 334-37.
125. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 31 ("A State may
request additional information from the Prosecutor to assist it in the application of arti-
cle 18, paragraph 2. Such a request shall not affect the one-month time limit provided
for in article 18, paragraph 2, and shall be responded to by the Prosecutor on an expe-
dited basis."); see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 338-39.
126. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 32 ("The Prosecutor
shall inform that State in writing when he or she makes an application to the Pre-Trial
Chamber under article 18, paragraph 2, and shall include in the notice a summary of
the basis of the application."); see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at
341.
127. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 33-34 (describing the
procedural requirements with respect to questions of jurisdiction or admissibility); see
also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 344-46.
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6. Rule 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which greatly
minimizes the possibility of politically-motivated charges by rogue states.
This rule requires that any non-State Party seeking to trigger an investiga-
tion would expose its own conduct to the full scrutiny of the ICC, thus
discouraging politically-motivated charges and efforts to hold only one
State accountable for alleged crimes within an overall situation. 128
7. Rule 195(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which can be
used in the future to carve out a special agreement between the United
States and the ICC. t 29
8. Rules 44-84 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence regulate the
Prosecutor's actions in ways that address many U.S. concerns about an
independent Prosecutor. 130
9. Continuing negotiations on defining the crime of aggression bene-
fited from intensive U.S. engagement to ensure that the definition is one the
United States ultimately could accept. 131
10. Formal introduction in the Preparatory Commission of U.S. pro-
posals to address concerns about exposure of a non-State Party to new or
amended crimes, 13 2 about the conduct of the Prosecutor, 13 3 and to
strengthen protection of complementarity. 134
128. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 29; see also LEE, ICC
ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 326-27, 347.
129. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 89.
The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a person without
the consent of a sending State if, under article 98, paragraph 2, such a request
would be inconsistent with obligations under an international agreement pursu-
ant to which the consent of a sending State is required prior to the surrender of
a person of that State to the Court.
Id.; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 666-69.
130. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 29-44; see also LEE, ICC
ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 325-48, 408-22.
131. See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 COR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 529, 534 (1999); see also Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanita-
rian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 277 (2000) ("An effective international criminal court
must have American support, but it can only be gained if both the United States and the
leadership of the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court seek an acceptable compromise that would not emasculate the court.").
132. See Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Proposal Submitted by
the United States of America Concerning Rules of Procedure and Evidence Relating to
Part 13 of the Statute (Final Clauses), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP.1
(2000) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP.1]; see also U.S. State-
ment on Its Proposal Concerning Rules of Procedure and Evidence Relating to Part 13 of
the Statute (Final Clauses) (2000).
133. See Working Group on a Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations
and the International Criminal Court, Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator,
Art. 4-5, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/RT.1 (2000) [hereinafter Discussion
Paper PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/RT. 11.
134. See U.S. Proposal U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17, supra note 42,
at 1.
In order to encourage contributions by States to promote international peace
and security, and unless there has been a referral to the Court pursuant to
article 13(b) of the Statute, the United Nations and the Court agree that the
Court shall determine on its own motion pursuant to article 19(1) the admissi-
bility of a case in accordance with article 17 when there is a request for the
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In my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
July 28, 1998, I identified eight flaws in the ICC Treaty that compelled the
United States to vote against the draft treaty that emerged from the Rome
Conference. 135 The following list sets forth each designated flaw in the
ICC Treaty and those corrections that either were adopted by the Prepara-
tory Commission following U.S. initiatives or were introduced for substan-
tive discussion in 2001.
1. Article 12: Preconditions to Jurisdiction (Exposure of the United States
as a Non-State Party)
Flaw: Article 12136 has the potential of enabling a non-State Party of
concern (for example, an aggressor state) to invoke the jurisdiction of the
ICC over another non-State Party for an alleged crime by the latter State
without subjecting the non-State Party of concern to ICC jurisdiction for its
own alleged crimes within the same situation.
Correction 1: Rule 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 137
greatly minimizes politically-motivated charges by rogue or aggressor
states. Successfully sought by the United States, this rule requires that any
non-State Party invoking an Article 12 procedure must expose its own con-
duct to the full scrutiny of the ICC, 138 thus discouraging politically-moti-
vated charges and efforts to hold only one state accountable for alleged
surrender of a suspect who is charged in such case with a crime that occurred
outside the territory of the suspect's State of nationality.
Id.
135. See 1998 Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 7, at
12-15.
136. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 12.
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdic-
tion of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or
have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or,
if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of regis-
tration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required
under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar,
accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay
or exception in accordance with Part 9.
Id.
137. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 29.
When a State lodges, or declares to the Registrar its intent to lodge, a declaration
with the Registrar pursuant to article 12, paragraph 3, or when the Registrar acts
pursuant to sub-rule 1, the Registrar shall inform the State concerned that the
declaration under article 12, paragraph 3, has as a consequence the acceptance
of jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5 of relevance to
the situation and the provisions of Part 9, and any rules thereunder concerning
States Parties, shall apply.
Id.; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 326-27.
138. See id.
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crimes within an overall situation. Thus a major concern of the United
States was greatly diminished with Rule 44(2), which delegations under-
stood as a rule designed to address the U.S. concern. 139
Correction 2: Rule 195(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 140
can be used in the future to carve out a special agreement between the
United States and the ICC under Article 98(2) of the ICC Treaty. 14 1 Pro-
posed by the United States and, following negotiation and revision,
adopted by consensus, Rule 195(2) nonetheless may prove contentious as
some governments hold the opinion that Article 98(2) agreements can only
be between or among governments. This view was contested by the United
States during the June 2000 Preparatory Commission session, and the lan-
guage of Rule 195(2) does not explicitly require only governmental agree-
ments. 14 2 The ICC has international legal personality 14 3 and clearly has
the statutory authority to enter into international agreements. 14 4 There is
a high probability that in coming years the ICC, acting with the approval of
the Assembly of States Parties, will find it in its own interests to enter into
international agreements with regional entities (such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) or one or more governments in order to address a
specific challenge facing the Court.
Correction 3 (rejected): In March 2000 the United States discussed
with other governments and informally at the June 2000 session of the
Preparatory Commission a provision for the Relationship Agreement
between the ICC and the United Nations that would address the issue of
exposure of non-State Party nationals to the jurisdiction of the Court. The
proposed text read:
139. Rule 44(2) addresses the concern raised by the United States before the UN
General Assembly's Sixth Committee on Oct. 22, 1998, and which J. Gurult erroneously
regards as a continuing major impediment to U.S. support for the ICC Treaty. See
Gurule, supra note 34, at 21. Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by the territorial
State is therefore manifestly not a foregone conclusion. Contra id.
140. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 89.
The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a person without
the consent of a sending State if, under article 98, paragraph 2, such a request
would be inconsistent with obligations under an international agreement pursu-
ant to which the consent of a sending State is required prior to the surrender of
a person of that State to the Court.
Id.; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 666-69.
141. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(2).
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to sur-
render a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Id.
142. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 89.
143. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 4(1) ("The Court shall have international legal
personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of
its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.").
144. One example of such agreements is the Relationship Agreement between the
United Nations and the ICC delineated in Article 2 of the ICC Statute. See id. art. 2.
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The United Nations and the International Criminal Court agree that the
Court may seek the surrender or accept custody of a national who acts
within the overall direction of a U.N. Member State, and such directing State
has so acknowledged, only in the event
(a) the directing State is a State Party to the Statute or the Court obtains
the consent of the directing State, or
(b) measures have been authorized pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter against the directing State in relation to the situation or actions
giving rise to the alleged crime or crimes, provided that in connection
with such authorization the Security Council has determined that this
subsection shall apply. 14 5
We readily acknowledged that the Article 13(b) 146 power of the Secur-
ity Council to refer a situation to the ICC for action could subject non-State
Party nationals to the jurisdiction of the Court despite the conditions set
forth in this proposal.
The March 2000 proposal was intended to focus on the official actions
of non-States Parties, including those undertaken in UN peacekeeping and
peace enforcement operations or in UN-authorized military deployments,
and to shield the military personnel engaged in such actions unless state
consent was obtained or the state at issue was the object of a Chapter VII
enforcement action of any character. We included the latter requirement in
order to prevent rogue or aggressor non-States Parties, which in most cases
would already be the target of UN Security Council action, from benefiting
from the provision in the Relationship Agreement. I originally had hoped
this "carve-back" on the overall provision would include UN Security
Council actions against a non-State Party under general UN Charter
authority, and not only under Chapter VII powers. But that view did not
prevail.
The March 2000 proposal attracted far more skepticism and opposi-
tion than encouragement from other governments. Non-governmental
organizations also lashed out at it, 14 7 igniting more skepticism among
delegations to the Preparatory Commission. Two major criticisms were the
de facto inclusion of internal conflicts and atrocities in the proposal and
the inclusion of Security Council determinations. In September 2000, 1
announced publicly at American University Washington College of Law
what I had been discussing diplomatically for some time: that we would be
prepared to modify the proposal to refer only to international conflicts, to
remove all references to the Security Council, and to find some formula
145. See U.S. Proposed Text for ICC Supplemental Document, supra note 70.
146. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 13(b).
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII or the Charter of the United Nations ....
Id.
147. See generally N.G.O. Information, at http://www.iccnow.org/html/n.g.o..html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
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that would protect only those non-States Parties acting responsibly in the
international community and honoring the principle of complementar-
ity.148 Despite further diplomatic efforts to structure such a proposal, we
received no encouragement from other governments to pursue even the
modified version of the March 2000 proposal. There was above all great
aversion to crafting language to protect the interests of a non-State Party,
particularly when so many non-State Parties were the major perpetrators of
the crimes falling within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.
Correction 4 (proposed): As discussed above, the proposal introduced
by the U.S. delegation on December 7, 2000, that focuses on the Court's
right under Article 19(1) of the ICC Statute to review the admissibility of a
case when there is a request for surrender of a suspect, 149 would introduce
a healthy backstop to the Court's personal jurisdiction, particularly with
respect to U.S. service members who should be dealt with by national
courts long before a surrender request is made.
2. Article 124: Transitional Provision: The Right of a State Party to Opt
Out of War Crimes Charges for Seven Years, but Implicitly Exposing
Non-States Parties (even Signatories) to War Crimes Charges
Flaw: Article 124150 provides States Parties with the right to "opt out"
of war crimes jurisdiction for seven years while, at least in theory, a non-
State Party could deploy its soldiers abroad and be vulnerable to assertions
of war crimes jurisdiction. No comparable right to "opt out" is explicitly
provided to non-States Parties. 151
Proposed correction requiring, at a minimum, the leverage of U.S. signa-
tory status: In 2000, there was a proposal inspired by a friendly govern-
ment and informally discussed among key governments and non-
governmental organizations that would extend the Article 124 right to opt
out of war crimes to signatory States that have not yet ratified the Treaty. I
worked this concept very hard, including a final trip to Europe to discuss
the concept with key governments in early January 2001. Some govern-
ments that have ratified the Treaty insisted on retaining an advantage over
signatories on this point, but innovative approaches were developed to
accommodate them. Nonetheless, not enough traction on the proposal had
taken hold by the end of the Clinton Administration, although continued
148. See AU Speech, supra note 3, at 3.
149. See U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17, supra note 42.
150. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 124.
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to
this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into
force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a
crime is alleged to have committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declara-
tion under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this
article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with
article 123, paragraph 1.
id.
151. See id.
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negotiations led by the Bush Administration might have proven productive.
But they were not pursued.
3. Article 121(5): Amendments Adding New Crimes: The Right of a State
Party to Opt Out of a New or Amended Crime but Implicitly Exposing a
Non-State Party to the New or Amended Crime
Flaw: Under Article 121(5),152 States Parties can avoid jurisdiction
over acts committed by their nationals or on their territory for any new or
amended crimes, such as aggression, terrorism, or drug trafficking. The
provision, however, could be interpreted to extend jurisdiction over non-
States Parties for such new or amended crimes.
Proposed correction requiring, at a minimum, the leverage of U.S. signa-
tory status: There is an existing U.S. proposal for the Rules of Procedure
for the Assembly of States Parties that would correct this flaw. It reads:
With respect to a crime added by amendment to the Statute pursuant to
article 121, paragraph 5, the court may exercise jurisdiction only if the
amendment has entered into force for both the State of nationality of the
alleged perpetrator and the State in whose territory the crime was
committed. 153
4. Article 15: Proprio Motu Prosecutor- Enabling the Prosecutor to Self-
Initiate Investigations with Pre-Trial Chamber Approval
Flaw: Article 15 enables the Prosecutor to self-initiate investigations
with the consent of two judges and without referral to the ICC of a situa-
tion either by a State Party or by the Security Council. 154
Correction: Rules 44-84 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence regu-
late the Prosecutor's actions.' 5 5 Rules 51-56156 in particular were pro-
posed or supported by the U.S. delegation to constrain the Prosecutor's
efforts to second-guess national efforts under Article 18(2). 15 7 Other rules
152. See id. art. 121(5).
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for
those State Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State
Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by
that State Party's nationals or on its territory.
Id.
153. See U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP.1, supra note 132, at 2.
154. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 15.
155. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 29-44; see also LEE, ICC
ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 325-48, 408-22.
156. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 31-32.
157. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 18(2).
Within one month of receipt of that notification, a State may inform the Court
that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its juris-
diction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes referred to in
Article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the notification to
States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's inves-
tigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of the
Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation.
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discipline the Prosecutor on rules of evidence, particularly on how to han-
dle cases of sexual violence, 158 how to preserve the privileged character of
certain communications,' 5 9 how to protect against self-incrimination of a
witness,' 60 defense counsel's right to pre-trial disclosure,' 6 1 inspection of
material in the possession or control of the Prosecutor,' 62 and restrictions
on disclosure. 163 These rules now supplement key articles of the Treaty.
Article 16 provides that the Security Council can prevent or stop any inves-
tigation or prosecution. 164 Articles 17-19 empower any State to invoke the
principle of complementarity (deferral to national jurisdictions) with
respect to a relevant situation or case (Article 19 permits a challenge by the
accused also), and thus remove the matter from the Prosecutor's initiative
(although the Prosecutor has certain rights to seek to resume investigations
or prosecutions with the approval of the judges if the State is unwilling or
genuinely unable to effectively exercise complementarity). 165
Proposed correction requiring, at a minimum, the leverage of U.S. signa-
tory status: In the November/December 2000 session of the Preparatory
Commission, the U.S. delegation proposed negotiations for the "Other
Issues" working group that was anticipated to convene at a forthcoming
Preparatory Commission session, as follows:
The United States of America proposes for the consideration of the Prepara-
tory Commission the development of factors for the Court that may be rele-
vant for the investigation, prosecution and surrender of suspects, including
the context within which an alleged crime has occurred and a State's contri-
bution to international peace and security. 166
This proposal has some potential for establishing guidelines that
should inform the Prosecutor's actions, but only if pursued vigorously by
the United States.
5. Article 5: The Undefined Crime of Aggression.
Flaw: Article 5 includes the "crime of aggression"'167 in the ICC's sub-
Id.
158. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 37-38 (incorporating
Rules 70-72 that provide guidance for the Prosecutor in connection with sexual violence
cases).
159. See id. at 38 (displaying, in Rule 73, the evidentiary and procedural requirements
for preserving the contents of privileged communications and information).
160. See id. at 39-41 (laying out the standards against self-incrimination in Rules 74-
75).
161. See id. at 41 (outlining pre-trial due process rights in Rule 76).
162. Rule 77 requires that the Prosecutor disclose any and all materials that prove to
be essential to the defense's case or that he/she intends to use at trial. See id. at 41.
163. Rules 81-84 provide for such restrictions. See id. at 43-44.
164. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 16.
165. See id. arts. 17-19.
166. See Preparatory Commission For the International Criminal Court; Working
Group on a Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court; Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/DP.1 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/DP.1].
167. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1)(d).
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ject matter jurisdiction but does not make it an actionable crime. A crime
becomes actionable only after the ICC Treaty has been amended 168 with a
definition for the crime of aggression and a procedure to trigger an investi-
gation of it. The United States believed it was premature to include the
crime of aggression in the ICC Treaty in any form until these requirements
are satisfied. But no real harm has resulted yet because the process of
defining the crime and settling on its trigger is a long negotiating process,
so the real issue is how the matter is resolved in the future.
On-going correction requiring, at a minimum, the leverage of U.S. signa-
tory status: The United States must remain deeply engaged in on-going
negotiations in the Preparatory Commission concerning the definition, ele-
ments and requirements for the crime of aggression. The United States was
joined by other delegations, including the other Permanent Members of the
UN Security Council, in arguing for the requirements that 1) the Security
Council must trigger investigation of the actionable crime of aggression by
first determining that a State has committed aggression, and 2) the defini-
tion must be based strictly on customary international law and hence be of
a narrow character (for example, a "war of aggression"). These discussions
will continue probably for years and need a strong and credible U.S. voice
in them. Any amendment including an actionable crime of aggression
would have to achieve ratification by seven-eighths of all States Parties,
which is a very high bar. 1 69 If the United States were to be a State Party
prior to such an amendment, it could "opt out" of the crime of aggression
forever pursuant to the Article 121(5) right for States Parties.' 70
6. Resolution E and Article 123 - Crimes of Terrorism and Drug Crimes
Flaw: Resolution E adopted at the Rome Conference recommended
that the Review Conference to be held seven years after entry into force of
the ICC Treaty 17 1 should "consider the crimes of terrorism and drug
crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclu-
sion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court."'172 The
United States opposed this language in Rome because we were not con-
sulted on it and had no opportunity to debate it at the conference. Its
inclusion in Resolution E occurred in secret on the night of July 16, 1998.
We had maintained a long-standing position, well known to all delegations,
that these two categories of crimes were inappropriate for ICC
jurisdiction. 1 73
Correction: Nothing in the ICC Treaty requires the inclusion of crimes
of terrorism and drug crimes. The issue will only emerge at the seven-year
168. The first opportunity is seven years after entry into force. See id. art. 123.
169. See id. art. 121(6).
170. See id. art. 121(5).
171. See id. art. 123.
172. See BAssioUNI, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 104-05.
173. See 1995 Report, supra note 7, at 11 ("The United States Government continues
to reserve its judgment on whether conventions related to crimes of international terror-
ism ... are appropriate for the jurisdiction of the ICC.").
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review conference and only if States Parties desire to pursue it seriously at
that time. There was little discussion of these crimes during Preparatory
Commission meetings prior to the September/October 2001 session. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States may make
discussion of the crime of terrorism as a new crime for the ICC more plau-
sible in the future. However, the issue of defining an actionable crime of
terrorism will doubtless be an enormous challenge for negotiators. There
may also need to be a special accommodation for anti-terrorism conven-
tions and their emphasis on domestic prosecution of terrorist actions.
7. Article 120: No Reservations
Flaw: Article 120 states, "No reservations may be made to this Stat-
ute."174 The United States opposed such a prohibition prior to and during
the Rome Conference.17 5 The U.S. delegation believed that at a minimum
there were certain provisions of the Treaty, particularly in the field of state
cooperation with the ICC, where domestic constitutional requirements and
national judicial procedures might require a reasonable opportunity for
reservations that did not defeat the intent or purpose of the Treaty. If some
qualified right to reservations had been permitted for the Treaty, then I
believe the United States would have been much better positioned to sup-
port or at least not object to the draft that emerged on July 17, 1998, in
Rome.
Article 120 stands unaltered. But some of the issues that the United
States might have found useful to create reservations about have been
addressed in the Preparatory Commission.' 76 It is also entirely possible
that other initiatives by the United States as a signatory of the ICC Treaty
could further lessen the desirability of reservations. If the United States
were to consider ratification of the ICC Treaty, then certain conditions and
understandings could be developed that would have essentially the same
protective character as reservations.
8. Article 8(2)(b)(viii): Occupied Territory
Flaw: Article 8(2)(b)(viii) defines as a war crime, "The transfer,
directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of
all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside
this territory .... ,177 While most of this text is drawn from well-estab-
174. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 120.
175. 1998 Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 7, at 15.
176. The Preparatory Commission addressed some U.S. concerns regarding Articles
12, 15, 8(2)(b)(viii), and it approved Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence sought by the United States. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 12 (outlining
the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction); see also id. art. 15; id., art. 8(2)(b)(viii)
(discussing the consequences of directly transferring civilians within and outside of
occupied territory). See generally ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30; LEE, ICC ELE-
MENTS AND RuLES, supra note 30, at 3-23 1; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note
31; LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 30, at 235-702.
177. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. (8)(2)(b)(viii) (emphasis added).
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lished customary international law codified in the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War178 and in
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1),' 79 the itali-
cized words are new and caused the United States and Israel considerable
concern over whether the crime would be used politically to prosecute
Israeli officials. The italicized words are not drawn from customary inter-
national law.
Correction: The problem was corrected, to the satisfaction of the Gov-
ernment of Israel, in the Elements of Crimes. The elements for Article
8(2)(b)(viii) include a footnote that reads, "The term 'transfer' needs to be
interpreted in accordance with the relevant provisions of international
humanitarian law." 180 This footnote assures Israel that any allegation
regarding this particular war crime would have to be grounded in estab-
lished international humanitarian law. On December 31, 2000, Israel
signed the ICC Treaty with the following relevant statement:
At the 1998 Rome Conference, Israel expressed its deep disappointment and
regret at the insertion into the Statute of formulations tailored to meet the
political agenda of certain states. Israel warned that such an unfortunate
practice might reflect on the intent to abuse the Statute as a political tool.
Today, in the same spirit, the Government of the State of lsrael signs the
Statute while rejecting any attempt to interpret provisions thereof in a politi-
cally motivated manner against Israel and its citizens. The Government of
Israel hopes that Israel's expressions of concern of any such attempt would
be recorded in history as a warning against the risk of politicization, that
might undermine the objectives of what is intended to become a central
impartial body, benefiting mankind as a whole. 18 1
In summary, during the Preparatory Commission sessions of 1999
and 2000, the most significant flaws, Articles 12 and 15, were partially
corrected and the stage was set for further corrections. The flaw in Article
121(5) was positioned for correction in 2001. The flaw in Article 124 was
ripe for further negotiation following intensive discussions in 2000. The
flaws in Article 5 (crime of aggression) and Resolution E (crimes of terror-
ism and drug trafficking) remain non-threatening and should remain so
provided the United States continues to engage constructively and with
credible leverage as a signatory state in the Preparatory Commission dis-
cussions about these crimes. The U.S. delegation was concerned about
being blindsided with reference to these crimes in the ICC Treaty and in
178. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 47-78, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 318-338 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y4gcpcp.htm.
179. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art.
63, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), available at http://wwwl.umn.
edu/humanrts/instree/y5pagc.htm.
180. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 28; see also LEE, ICC ELEMENTS AND
RULES, supra note 31, at 158-62.
181. See Israel's Signature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC); Statement Upon Signature, at 1 (2000) (on file with the Cornell International Law
journal).
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Resolution E at Rome, and my testimony before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee within a week after the conclusion of the Rome Confer-
ence demonstrated that concern. 18 2 But the reality is that none of these
crimes are actionable crimes until the Treaty is amended to incorporate
them (no sooner than seven years after the Treaty enters into force' 8 3 ) so
they would not present any imminent threat to U.S. interests when the ICC
is established and begins to operate. The flaw in Article 120 is irreversible
(short of amendment to the ICC Treaty which can take place no sooner
than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty' 84), but as other flaws
are corrected, the need or desirability to seek reservations to the Treaty
diminishes. This certainly occurred with the work product of the Prepara-
tory Commission during 1999 and 2000. The utility of conditions and
understandings attached to U.S. instruments of ratification of the ICC
Treaty should not be underestimated. Finally, the flaw in Article
8(2)(b)(viii) was corrected.185
D. Unresolved Concerns on December 31, 2000
Important U.S. concerns about the ICC Treaty regime that remained
unresolved on December 31, 2000, thus were the following:
1. The potential, albeit remote possibility of exposure of U.S. service
members to the jurisdiction of the ICC while the United States remains a
non-State Party (Article 12). A U.S. proposal for the Preparatory Commis-
sion sought to address this issue. 18 6
2. The anomaly in Article 121(5) that grants a State Party the right to
opt out of a new or amended crime but implicitly exposes a non-State Party
to the new or amended crime. A U.S. proposal for the Preparatory Com-
mission sought to address this issue. 187
3. The need for reasonable guidelines for the proprio motu Prosecutor
(Article 15). A U.S. proposal for the Preparatory Commission sought to
address this issue. 188
4. A proper definition and trigger for the crime of aggression (Article
5). The long history of active U.S. engagement in negotiations set the stage
for U.S. leadership on this issue in 2001.
5. Determine what steps the United States should take under Article
98(2) of the Statute to confirm the applicability of existing Status of Forces
Agreements and the possible need to negotiate additional international
agreements that would prevent the surrender of U.S. citizens to the ICC
without U.S. consent.
182. See 1998 Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 7, at
14.
183. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 121(1).
184. See id.
185. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
186. See U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17, supra note 42.
187. See U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP.1, supra note 132, at 2.
188. See Discussion Paper PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/RT.1, supra note 133, arts. 4-
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6. Determine how the U.S. federal criminal code (U.S.C. Title 18) and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.S.C. Title 10) should be amended
to ensure that crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC can be thor-
oughly investigated and prosecuted in U.S. courts, thus ensuring U.S. reli-
ance on the complementarity provisions in the ICC Treaty. 189
The premise underlying these remaining concerns about the ICC
Treaty was the need for continued active engagement by the United States
as a signatory in the Preparatory Commission sessions, bilateral and multi-
lateral negotiations on Article 98(2) agreements, and the amendment of
relevant domestic law. As of early 2002, the Bush Administration had not
pursued any of these endeavors with the exception of a minimalist, mid-
level presence at the Preparatory Commission sessions generating occa-
sional interventions on the crime of aggression and financial rules and
regulations.
III. Safeguards for U.S. Personnel Under the ICC Treaty Regime
The central issue confronting the United States government with respect to
the ICC is the risk that the Court may seek to investigate, obtain custody
of, and ultimately prosecute a U.S. service member or U.S. Government
official in connection with that individual's official duty. Although refer-
enced in somewhat different contexts earlier in this article, the safeguards
that already exist in the ICC Statute and its supplemental documents are
significant when viewed in their totality. I often referred to these as the
"matrix of safeguards" that would minimize the risk of prosecution of U.S.
service members and government officials. The following list focuses on
the major safeguards.
A. Safeguards Available Without U.S. Ratification of the ICC Treaty
1. Complementarity
The complementarity principle (Articles 17, 18, and 19) was championed
by the United States throughout the nearly five-year period of negotiations
leading to the ICC Treaty and to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted on June 30, 2000. In fact, the most potent complementarity provi-
sion, Article 18, was entirely a U.S. proposal that, following some revision
in negotiations, was adopted at the Rome Conference. 190 I doubt that
many delegates would dispute the view that the maximum possible protec-
tion under complementarity was achieved in the negotiations. Although
the United States pursued various proposals that would have strengthened
complementarity even more than what resulted in both the Treaty and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, until the U.S. proposal of December 7,
2001191 there was no other realistic means to push the envelope of comple-
189. See generally Cassel, supra note 39, at 428-35.
190. See Proposal Submitted by the United States of America: Preliminary Rulings
Regarding Admissibility, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/WG.3/DP.2.
191. See U.S. Proposal U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17, supra note 42.
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mentarity any further.
The complementarity principle requires that the ICC defer to national
legal systems that are willing and able to investigate and, if merited, prose-
cute perpetrators over which they have jurisdiction. 19 2 The United States
should be able to meet this test with respect to U.S. personnel, and thus
render inadmissible any relevant case, provided U.S. federal law and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice are amended to track thoroughly all of
the specific crimes in Articles 5-8 of the ICC Treaty.1 9 3 Without such
amendments to U.S. law, arguments could be raised that a gap in U.S. law
renders the United States "unable" to investigate and prosecute the specific
crime. Many of the concerns about the complementarity regime as it
would be applied to the United States are concerns that would be vastly
diminished if U.S. law were revised to close the gaps between U.S. law and
the ICC Treaty. Ultimate U.S. ratification could be made conditional upon
adoption of the necessary amendments to U.S. law, but such amendments
should be undertaken in any event since complementarity is available as
protection even to non-States Parties. This will be critical during the years
that the United States is only a signatory to the ICC Treaty. Many signa-
tory States are undertaking this revision exercise of their national criminal
codes.194
Some of the criticism of the complementarity regime is either ill-
informed or unrealistic. The desire for a strictly "objective standard to
determine whether the ICC should assert jurisdiction when a State decides
not to prosecute"195 is laudable, but exceptionally difficult to codify while
still providing the Court with enough latitude to exercise jurisdiction over
rogue or recalcitrant states that seek to abuse the complementarity privi-
lege. Nonetheless, the criteria for determinations of "unwillingness" and
"inability" in Article 17(2) and (3) must be applied by the Court and their
objectivity is as, if not more, rigorous than alternative formulations of
"clearly erroneous" or "reasonable basis" that have been proposed. 196 Any
attempt to re-open these criteria would risk weakening the complementar-
192. See Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Con-
sistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 26-
27 (2001).
The complementarity principle is the fulcrum that prioritizes the authority of
domestic forums to prosecute the crimes defined by Article 5 of the Rome Stat-
ute. Phrased another way, the complementarity principle is intended to pre-
serve the power of the ICC over irresponsible states that refuse to prosecute
nationals who commit heinous international crimes, but balances that suprana-
tional power against the sovereign right of states to prosecute their own nation-
als without external interference.
id.
193. See generally Cassel, supra note 39, at 428-35.
194. Canada, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Spain, Australia (as signa-
tory), and New Zealand are some of the states that have signed and/or ratified the ICC
Treaty and have revised their domestic law accordingly. See generally Recent Govern-
ment Documents/Implementating Legislation, at www.iccnow.org/html/gov_t.html
(January 2001).
195. Gurule, supra note 34, at 9.
196. See id.
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ity regime rather than strengthening it - a prospect well recognized by
delegations in the final days of the Rome Conference. Nonetheless, the
U.S. delegation tightened the review criteria for admissibility in the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence. After much negotiation in the Preparatory
Commission, delegations agreed upon Rule 51 which states that a State
referred to in Article 17(1), including one that has decided not to prosecute
a suspect, may bring to the Court's attention information "showing that its
courts meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the inde-
pendent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct, or that the State has
confirmed in writing to the Prosecutor that the case is being investigated or
prosecuted." 19 7
In negotiations over Article 18,198 the United States had sought to
require a unanimous decision by judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber and in
the Appeals Chamber when challenging the sufficiency of a State's investi-
gations into a situation. But the majority rule prevailed in the negotia-
tions. 19 9 Concern raised about the prosecutor's power to investigate under
Article 15200 must be tempered with the reality of how the complementar-
ity regime is implemented, a barrier that Article 15(4) acknowledges.
Critics of Article 18 seek vainly to find some definitive way to prohibit
the ICC Prosecutor from pursuing an investigation after a State has exer-
cised its right under Article 18 to investigate its nationals or others within
its jurisdiction with respect to a situation being investigated by the Prose-
cutor. At each one of these breakpoints in the complementarity regime,
some means had to be devised for the investigation to return to the Prose-
cutor in the event the State was not exercising its responsibilities to investi-
gate and prosecute perpetrators of atrocity crimes within the Court's
jurisdiction. The whole construct of complementarity could not have been
negotiated without these release valves. Otherwise, the complementarity
regime would have collapsed in the negotiations under the argument that
any State intending to prevent any credible investigation of atrocity crimes
and essentially fostering a sham procedure at home would thwart perma-
nently the jurisdiction of the Court over these crimes. Critics who view the
complementarity regime only through the prism of worst case scenarios
that might expose U.S. service members to ICC jurisdiction engage in ana-
lytical exercises that are so narrow in scope as to be utterly unrealistic
when applied to the multilateral reality of the negotiations shaping the ICC
Treaty regime. In those negotiations the worst perpetrators of atrocity
crimes (hence not the United States) necessarily have been focused upon.
Proposals that would have the effect of shielding the worst perpetrators
from ICC jurisdiction find little if any support among governments sup-
porting the ICC Treaty, and their consensus is required for the adoption of
any proposal.
197. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 31.
198. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 18.
199. See Gurule, supra note 34, at 19-40.
200. See id.
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2. Negotiation and Confirmation of Article 98(2) Agreements
The United States can negotiate bilateral or multilateral agreements to pro-
tect any American citizen from surrender to the ICC.20 1 The United States
can leverage the approval of such international agreements with particular
countries as a precondition to wide-ranging U.S. cooperation with the
Court during its non-State Party status and ultimately to U.S. ratification
of the ICC Treaty. Existing Status of Forces Agreements already constitute
de facto Article 98(2) agreements for personnel in SOFA jurisdictions.20 2
Rule 195(2),203 successfully sought by the United States, leaves open the
possibility of negotiation of an international agreement between the ICC
and the United States to protect any American citizen from surrender to the
ICC.
3. Security Council Power to Refer Situations
The power of the Security Council to refer situations 20 4 enables the Coun-
cil to shape the ICC's jurisdiction in any particular situation provided suf-
ficient support is found in the Council to refer the situation under a
Chapter VII resolution. This means that if the Council seizes the opportu-
nity, particularly in a situation that has already engaged the Council as a
threat to international peace and security, to refer a situation to the ICC,
then such referral can be tailored to minimize the exposure to ICC jurisdic-
tion of military forces deployed to confront the threat. The Chapter VII
resolution would define the parameters of the Court's investigations in the
particular situation. The Security Council also could use the power of
referral to insulate domestic amnesty arrangements from the reach of the
ICC by specifying in a referral, for example, that those individuals who
have received or will receive amnesty in accordance with domestic proce-
dures fall outside the scope of the referral. This may be particularly rele-
vant for amnesties of low and mid-level personnel who normally would be
of little interest to an ICC Prosecutor anyway. But the power of the Secur-
ity Council to shape the referral could facilitate peace-making while still
upholding a significant role for the ICC to play in achieving international
justice in any particular situation. The United States will exercise more
influence to initiate or shape these decisions as a constructive signatory of
the ICC Treaty than as an opponent to the Court. Two permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and France, have ratified
the ICC Treaty 20 5 and thus will not entertain U.S. proposals designed to
undermine the Court or confirm U.S. opposition to the Court. In addition,
as a signatory of the ICC Treaty, Russia20 6 is unlikely to join any U.S.
201. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(2).
202. See Ruth Wedgwood, Consensus Through the "Ithaca Package", 32 CORNELL INT'L
I.J. 535, 541 (1999) ("SOFA agreements bar arrests under ICC jurisdiction.., in light of
Article 98 of the Rome Statute .... "). But see Paust, supra note 68, at 10-15.
203. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 89.
204. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 13(l)(b).
205. See Country-by-Country Ratification Status Report, supra note 25.
206. See id.
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opposition to the Court.
4. Security Council Power to Prevent ICC Action
The Security Council can prevent the ICC from investigating and prosecut-
ing crimes for one year, and can renew any such resolution under the same
conditions. 20 7 This power can be a substantial protection for U.S. interests
but only if the United States has the credibility, as a constructive signatory
of the ICC Treaty, to persuade other Council members, both permanent
and non-permanent, that such suspension of ICC action is not intended as
an assault on the ICC or as a challenge to its legitimacy but rather as a
necessary action to restore or maintain international peace and security.
5. High Thresholds for ICC Crimes
The threshold for any ICC investigation and prosecution of crimes is high
enough that it is unlikely that the United States and its official personnel
should plan and engage in such extraordinarily severe and systematic
crimes so as to trigger the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. The
jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the "most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole."20 8 "Genocide" requires the
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or relig-
ious group. '20 9 "Crimes against humanity" must be "committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack, '2 10 and that attack must involve the multiple
commission of crimes against any civilian population, "pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack."2 1 1
"War crimes" fall within ICC jurisdiction "in particular when commit-
ted as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes,"2 12 and only when the material elements of the crime are commit-
ted with intent and knowledge. 2 13 Prior to. the Rome Conference, the
United States sought a higher and more definitive threshold for war crimes
charges by removing the words "in particular" from the definition in Article
8(1),214 but there was concern among other governments, including many
of our NATO allies, that we not superimpose upon the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 a higher threshold. It
was feared that the enforceability of these conventions would be impaired if
the ICC Treaty created a new threshold not otherwise found in the conven-
tions themselves. Nonetheless, when joined with the preambular language,
Article 5(1),215 the prominence given to the requirements of Article 8(1) in
207. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 16.
208. See id. art. 5(1).
209. See id. art. 6.
210. See id. art. 7(1).
211. See id. art. 7(2)(a).
212. See id. art. 8(1).
213. See id. art. 8.
214. See id. art. 8(1).
215. See id. art. 5(1).
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the provision itself,2 16 and the simple reality that the ICC cannot expend
its resources on the investigation and prosecution of isolated war crimes by
individual soldiers, the threshold for war crimes should remain relatively
high. The ICC will look foolish pursuing an individual soldier for an iso-
lated war crime that does not meet the important criteria set forth in Arti-
cle 8(1).217
6. Elements of Crimes
The Elements of Crimes impose stricter discipline on the prosecution of
ICC crimes than found only in the Statute. 2 18 In general, a person must
commit material elements of a crime with intent and knowledge about that
crime. 219
With respect to the crime of genocide, the conduct must take place "in
the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the
group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.
' 22 0
With respect to crimes against humanity, the necessary "policy to
commit such attack"221 against a civilian population requires that the State
or organization "actively promote or encourage such an attack against a
civilian population. ' 222 The perpetrator must have known that the con-
duct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 223
With respect to war crimes, the elements of war crimes must be inter-
preted within the established framework of the international law of armed
conflict including, as appropriate, the international law of armed conflict
applicable to armed conflict at sea. The perpetrator must be aware of the
factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed con-
flict.2 24 Regarding the war crimes of attacking civilians or civilian objects,
the perpetrator must have intended the civilian population as such or indi-
vidual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities or such civilian objects
to be the object of the attack.225 Regarding the war crime of excessive inci-
dental death, injury, or damage, it must be of such an extent as to be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated. 2 26
216. See id. art. 8(1).
217. This is why the definitions of war crimes do not contain the requirements seen
for crimes against humanity. See Gurule, supra note 34, at 31.
218. See Lietzau, supra note 33, at 4.
219. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 5 ("As stated in article 30, unless
otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are commit-
ted with intent and knowledge.").
220. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 6.
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 23.
225. Id.
226. See generally id. at 27.
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7. Criteria the Prosecutor Must Consider before Initiating an Investigation
The Prosecutor must consider whether
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis
to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is
being committed;
(b) The case is or would be admissible under Article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims,
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation
would not serve the interests of justice [the last fact is effective only if con-
firmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber]. 22 7
At the request of the requesting State or the Security Council if it has
made a referral, the Pre-Trial Chamber may review the Prosecutor's deci-
sion not to proceed and request the Prosecutor to reconsider that
decision.2 28
8. Protection from Politically-Motivated Charges by Non-States Parties
When a non-State Party seeks to accept the jurisdiction of the Court by
"declaration" to advance a particular set of charges, it must accept the juris-
diction of the Court for the whole situation at issue, and thus open itself
up to ICC scrutiny. 229
9. Rights of Suspects and the Constitutionality of the ICC Treaty
Suspects are accorded a comprehensive set of due process rights that fulfill
constitutional requirements for a treaty of this character establishing an
International Criminal Court.230 Critics who have focused on supposed
U.S. constitutional defects in the ICC Treaty are either ill-informed about
the treaty regime, including its supplemental documents, or overlook inter-
national practice by the United States.2 3 1
227. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(1).
228. See id. art. 53(2).
229. See id. art. 12(3); see also ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at
29 (setting forth, in Rule 44(2), the procedural requirements for the declaration
described in Article 12(3) of the ICC Treaty); discussion supra Part II.C.1.
230. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, arts. 20, 22, 55, 57 (3), 58, 61(3), 63, 66, 67,
69(7). See generally ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31.
231. Compare Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr. The International Criminal Court vs.
the American People, at http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bgl249.html
(Feb. 5, 1999) ("U.S. participation would be unconstitutional because it would subject
individual Americans to trial and punishment in an extra-constitutional court without
affording them all the rights and protections the U.S. Constitution guarantees.") with
Leigh, supra note 68, at 130-31 ("Indeed, the list of due-process rights guaranteed by the
Rome Statute is, if anything, somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than those in
the American Bill or Rights. Not better, but more detailed.") and The International Crimi-
nal Court: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int'l Rel., 106th Cong. 92-101, 96 (2000)
(statement of Monroe Leigh on behalf of the American Bar Association) [hereinafter
Monroe Leigh statement] ("[lit cannot be denied that the Treaty of Rome contains the
most comprehensive list of due process protections which has so far been promul-
gated."). In further response to critics of the Rome Treaty, Leigh provided a point by
point comparison of due process rights in the Treaty of Rome and in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See Monroe Leigh statement, supra, at 90-91. One constitutional issue that merits
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further comment concerns jury trials. See Leigh, supra note 68, at 130 ("Trial by jury,
however, is not available to service members under the Fifth Amendment. They are
excepted from coverage by the text of the Fifth Amendment. And the same exception is
generally assumed to be applicable under the Sixth Amendment."); see also DEFENSE
NEWS OP-ED, supra note 3, at 1.
The fact that the treaty requires trial by judges is not surprising in an interna-
tional criminal court that merges common and civil law practice. It is well-set-
tled extradition practice to accept trial without jury outside the United States
and for these crimes qualified judges might be preferred to international jurors.
The difficulty the treaty's procedures arguably present under the U.S. Constitu-
tion is if the United States were to become a party to the treaty and an American
citizen commits on U.S. territory genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes that meet the court's rigorous tests of admissibility-a highly unlikely
event.
The reality is that our own prosecutors would pounce on that individual so
fast the international court would never have a right under the treaty to investi-
gate him. We successfully negotiated the procedures that grant our justice sys-
tem maximum discretion to seize a case against any U.S. citizen, even if the
crime is committed overseas, and if merited indict and prosecute him before an
American jury.
Id.; see also Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Boarders: The Constitutionality of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 125-26 (1995).
Excellent analyses of the U.S. Constitution and the ICC can be found in Marquardt
(although its publication in 1995 pre-dates the final text of the Rome Treaty) and in an
.essay by Professor Ruth Wedgwood of Yale Law School. I quote Professor Wedgwood at
some length because she has summarized the key arguments in this debate. See Ruth
Wedgwood, The Constitution and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 119, 121, 123 (2000).
The ICC is a new creation in international jurisprudence, and thus, one
should not expect cut-and-dried precedent on the matter. But the most persua-
sive answer is that there is no forbidding constitutional obstacle to U.S. partici-
pation in the treaty ....
First, the United States has used its treaty power in the past to participate in
other international tribunals that affect the lives and property of Americans.
Second, the ICC is carefully structured with procedural protections that
closely follow the guarantees and safeguards of the American Bill of Rights and
other liberal constitutional systems.
Third, the offenses within the ICC's jurisdiction would otherwise ordinarily
be handled through military courts-martial or through extradition of offenders
to the foreign nation where an offense occurred. Thus, the detailed structure of
American common law trial procedure would not ordinarily be applicable to
these cases in any event ....
American negotiators at Rome worked hard to ensure that the permanent ICC
would follow demanding standards of due process. To that end, any defendant
is guaranteed the right to have timely notice of the charges against him, the
presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, also forbidding
any adverse inference from the exercise of the right to silence, the right to the
assistance of counsel and to the assistance of an interpreter, the right to bail, the
right to a speedy trial, the right to conduct a defense in person or through the
defendant's chosen counsel, the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
him and to call witnesses on his own behalf, the right to disclosure of any excul-
patory evidence, the right not to bear any burden of proof but rather to require
the prosecution to prove guilt 'beyond reasonable doubt,' and the right not to be
subjected to any form of duress or coercion, or any cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing punishment. In addition, the ICC Statute even guarantees a form of Miranda
warnings - a privilege that has often been criticized in the United States since
its enunciation by the Supreme Court in 1966 as offering undue protection of
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10. Pre-Trial Chamber Protection of Suspect's Rights
The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders to assist a suspect in the prepara-
tion of his or her defense 23 2 and must periodically review its ruling on the
detention of a suspect and ensure that a suspect is not detained for an
unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecu-
tor.2 33 If such delay occurs, the Court must consider releasing the suspect,
with or without conditions. 234
11. Protection of National Security Information
The United States has full power to withhold information or documents
from the Court if such disclosure would, in the opinion of the United
States Government, prejudice its national security interests. 235 If a State
Party or the United Nations is requested by the Court to provide docu-
ments or information in its custody which were disclosed in confidence to
it by the United States, the State Party shall seek the consent of the United
States as a pre-condition to any disclosure. 2 36 If the United States refuses
to consent, there is no disclosure of such information.2 37 The U.S. delega-
tion waged a long and often lonely and acrimonious struggle for this pro-
tection, and with the support of key governments this critical U.S.
requirement ultimately prevailed.
238
12. Diplomatic Immunity
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently . . . under interna-
tional law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of
that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 2 39
U.S. diplomats or other official personnel enjoying diplomatic immu-
nity in any jurisdiction thus would be shielded from a surrender request
criminal suspects. The Miranda case requires oral notice of rights when a defen-
dant is in custodial interrogation. The ICC statue is even more protective,
requiring that the prosecution advise a person of his rights before he is ques-
tioned whenever there are grounds to believe that he has committed a crime,
even in noncustodial interrogation - including a warning of the right to remain
silent, the right to legal assistance, the right to have counsel appointed if he
cannot afford it, and the right to be questioned in the presence of counsel.
The major differences from common law procedure in the ICC are the use of a
factfinding panel of three Judges instead of a jury, with a verdict to be rendered
by the vote of at least two Judges, and the availability of an appeal by the prose-
cution from errors of fact, law, and procedure.
Id.
232. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 57(3)(b).
233. Id. art. 60(4).
234. See id.
235. See id. art. 72.
236. Id. art. 73.
237. Id. art. 73.
238. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 73; see also Discussion Paper PCNICC/2000/
WGICC-UN/RT.1, supra note 133, art. 11.
239. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(1).
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from the ICC provided such immunity is consistent with international
law. 240
13. Rule of Specialty
A suspect surrendered to the Court cannot be proceeded against, pun-
ished, or detained for any conduct committed prior to surrender other than
the conduct which forms the basis of the crimes of which that person has
been surrendered. Thus the Court cannot prosecute the suspect for con-
duct that falls outside the conduct upon which the indictment is
framed. 241
B. Safeguards Proposed by the United States in 2000
1. Final Review of Admissibility
The United States proposed on December 7, 2000, a provision for the Rela-
tionship Agreement between the United Nations and the ICC that would
require the Court, on its own motion, to undertake a final review of admis-
sibility of a case when a surrender request is prepared against a suspect for
an alleged crime outside that suspect's territory of nationality. 242
2. Guidance to the Court
The United States proposed on December 7, 2000, that the Preparatory
Commission prepare factors for the Court to consider in the investigation,
prosecution, and surrender of suspects, including the context within which
a crime is committed and the contributions that a State makes to interna-
tional peace and security.243
3. Protection from Introduction of New Crimes
The United States proposed on June 8, 2000, that the Rules of Procedure
for the Assembly of States Parties require that,
With respect to a crime added by amendment to the Statute pursuant to
article 121, paragraph 5, the court may exercise jurisdiction only if the
amendment has entered into force for both the State of nationality of the
alleged perpetrator and the State in whose territory the crime was
committed. 2
44
4. International Agreements Relating to Surrender of Suspects to the ICC
The United States proposed during the June 2000 session of the Prepara-
tory Commission a provision that became Rule 195(2) of the Rules of Pro-
240. See id.
241. See id. art. 10.
242. See U.S. Proposal PCNlCC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17, supra note 42; see also dis-
cussion supra Part I.C.1.
243. See U.S. Proposal PCNICC/2000/DP.1, supra note 166; see also discussion supra
Part II.C.1.
244. See U.S. Proposal PCNlCC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP.1, supra note 132; see also dis-
cussion supra Part II.C.3.
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cedure and Evidence. 245 This rule keeps open the possibility of an
international agreement between the ICC and the United States that
focuses on the surrender issue.
C. Further Safeguards Available if the United States Were to Ratify the
ICC Treaty
1. Non-Exposure to War Crimes Charges for Seven Years
The United States could "opt-out" of any war crimes exposure before the
ICC during the initial seven years of U.S. participation as a State Party in
the Court.
2 46
2. Non-Exposure to the Crime of Aggression and Other New Crimes
The United States could "opt-out" forever of any amendment that would
add an actionable crime of aggression or any other new crime to the ICC
Treaty provided, in the event any such amendment is to be acted upon at
the seven-year review conference, the United States becomes a State Party
prior to that conference. 2 47
3. U.S. Influence in the Nomination and Election of Judges and
Prosecutors
Only as a State Party would the United States be entitled to nominate can-
didates for ICC judges and vote for the election of all judges. 2 48 Only
nationals of States Parties may be elected judges, 249 so a U.S. national, in
most cases, could only become a judge if the United States is a State
Party. 250 Only as a State Party would the United States be entitled to vote
for the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors. 25 '
4. U.S. Influence in the Operation of the ICC
While the United States as a State Party would be obligated to pay a pro-
portionate share of the ICC's costs, that fact alone would make the United
States the most influential government in the Assembly of States Parties
overseeing and determining the budget of the ICC each year and the elec-
tion of judges and prosecutors. The reliance on U.S. financial support can
deeply influence the priorities and actions of the ICC prosecutors and
judges.25 2
245. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 31, at 89; see also discussion
supra Part II.C.1.
246. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 124.
247. See id. art. 121(5); see also id. art. 123(1).
248. See id. art. 36(4)(a).
249. Id. art. 36(4)(b).
250. See id. art. 36(4). However, the ICC Statute provides the possibility for a dual
national to become a judge. Therefore, it is conceivable that a U.S. dual national resi-
dent in a country that is a State Party to the ICC, could be nominated and elected as a
Judge provided that he/she has met the other qualifications set forth in Article 36.
251. See id. art. 42(4).
252. See id. art. 112; see also id., art. 115. See generally Proceedings of the Prepara-
tory Commission at its Seventh Session; Annex Ill: Draft Financial Regulations and
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IV. Steps the United States Could Take to Live with the ICC Treaty
There are many initiatives that the United States Government could take to
further protect its interests in the establishment and operation of the ICC
and set the stage for consideration of ratification of the ICC Treaty by the
United States. Some of those initiatives are described below:
2 53
1. The United States should remain deeply engaged in the UN Prepar-
atory Commission negotiations to advance treaty-friendly proposals that
protect U.S. interests, such as strengthening complementarity, defining the
crime of aggression, ensuring proper exercise of power by the Prosecutor,
and ensuring that non-parties are not subject to new or amended crimes.
2. The United States should amend the U.S. federal criminal code
(Title 18) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Title 10) to ensure that
ICC crimes can be investigated and prosecuted domestically and thus ben-
efit from the principle of complementarity under the ICC Treaty, which is
the primary and strongest line of defense against unwarranted charges
against Americans. The White House should establish a non-partisan com-
mission of experts to ensure, through its oversight, that the United States
takes full advantage of its rights under the complementarity regime of the
ICC Treaty.
3. The United States should unilaterally declare every relevant Status
of Forces Agreement an Article 98(2) international agreement. The U.S.
delegation held open the probability throughout the negotiations that
existing Status of Forces Agreements constitute Article 98(2) agreements.
Indeed, the origin of Article 98(2) was the importance of the protection
afforded by Status of Forces Agreements. 25 4 The United States should con-
firm the relevance of the Status of Forces Agreements as soon as possible
and, if other governments acquiesce in the U.S. announcement, then their
sufficiency as Article 98(2) agreements should be sustained. If there are
objections to the U.S. announcement, then Washington can challenge the
objecting government to enter into a special Article 98(2) agreement with
the United States or suffer in its bilateral relationship with the United
States.
4. The United States should reinforce through executive declaration or
Congressional resolution the U.S. position that its signature on December
31, 2000, did not prejudice our long-standing legal interpretation of the
ICC Treaty regarding ICC jurisdiction over non-State Party nationals. For
example, relevant language might read, "U.S. signature of the ICC Treaty
does not prejudice our long-standing legal interpretation of the Treaty,
namely that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of
non-States Parties except under certain circumstances." We would want to
leave vague what those circumstances are (because they can be pragmati-
Rules, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1/Add.2 (2001), available at http://www.un.
org/law/icc/prepcomm/mar2001/english/revlad2e.pdf.
253. See generally David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on the International
Criminal Court, 167 Mi.. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001) [hereinafter Scheffer, Negotiator's
Perspective].
254. See 1995 Report, supra note 7, at 4.
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cally negotiated), but as discussed elsewhere in this Article we endorsed
jurisdiction arising from a UNSC Chapter VII referral to the Court 25 5 or
from consent of the State of nationality2 56 or for the purpose of bringing
rogue State perpetrators to justice. 25 7
5. The United States should negotiate Article 98(2) agreements with
targeted governments (particularly if we conclude they are not adequately
covered by Status of Forces Agreements), thus protecting U.S. personnel
from surrender to the ICC from those countries. This would enable the
United States to use its bilateral leverage to accomplish its multilateral
objective. In the context of the campaign against terrorism, the United
States should use its leverage with coalition members to achieve this protec-
tion. The United States would stipulate that it will not ratify the ICC
Treaty until a "critical mass" (defined reasonably) of such Article 98(2)
agreements have been concluded. The United States would continue to
include relevant non-surrender language in new extradition treaties and
mutual legal assistance treaties. 2 58
6. The United States should declare that if U.S. personnel are surren-
dered to the ICC without U.S. consent prior to U.S. ratification of the ICC
Treaty, the United States will suspend and perhaps terminate all measures
to ratify the Treaty. In any U.S. ratification exercise, there would be an
understanding prepared that if U.S. personnel are surrendered after U.S.
ratification despite U.S. objection and American exercise of complementar-
ity, then the United States must review its options for withdrawal from the
Treaty.
Conclusion
Two realities confront the United States: First, the establishment of the
International Criminal Court is a fait accompli and will be realized soon
whether or not the United States becomes one of the first sixty State Parties
to the ICC Treaty or whether or not the United States wages an opposition
campaign against the ICC. Second, the world indeed changed on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, in a direction that points towards constructive and multilat-
eral U.S. engagement in the enforcement of international criminal law,
including through the ICC. The flaws that remain in the ICC Treaty can be
addressed in such a manner as to assure the United States Government
that its interests are protected and that the Court remains focused on the
authentic perpetrators of atrocity crimes. But that prospect for remedying
the flaws will fade permanently unless the United States re-engages in the
Preparatory Commission and with its allies and friends to satisfactorily
address U.S. concerns in ways I have described in this Article and
255. See discussion supra note 66 and accompanying text.
256. See discussion supra note 68 and accompanying text.
257. See discussion supra note 67 and accompanying text.
258. Extradition Treaty with Poland, U.S. CONG. SERIAL SET, S. TREATY Doc. 105-14,
105th Cong. (July 9, 1997).
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elsewhere. 25 9
The September 11th terrorist attacks offer the opportunity to use U.S.
credibility as a signatory nation to request of our coalition partners in the
war against terrorism that they enter into Article 98(2) international agree-
ments with the United States. Washington could assure them that when a
critical mass of these agreements (and confirmation of relevant Status of
Forces Agreements) is obtained and certain treaty-friendly proposals by
the United States are satisfactorily considered either in the Preparatory
Commission or in the Assembly of States Parties, the Executive Branch will
submit the ICC Treaty to the United States Senate for its advice and con-
sent. Given the deployment in foreign territories and on the high seas of
U.S. military forces for an undetermined length of time in the campaign
against terrorism, there is every reason to argue for the merit of the Article
98(2) agreements and for confirmation of the reach of existing Status of
Forces Agreements (as well as any new Status of Forces Agreements that
are negotiated to accommodate U.S. troop deployments overseas).
The United States signed the ICC Treaty for the purpose of sustaining
U.S. leadership in the enforcement of the laws that seek to punish the per-
petrators of atrocity crimes. We should exercise that leadership, now more
than ever, with the courage and integrity that the rest of the world expects
us to demonstrate. If we abandon the opportunity to lead the world in the
investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes, then history will record
the inexplicable folly of a great nation.
259. See generally Negotiator's Perspective, supra note 253; DEFENSENEws OP-ED, supra
note 3.
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